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In this dissertation, I analyze the 20th century text, A 
Room of One’s Own, by Virginia Woolf (2005), and I engage with 
Woolf’s concept of a woman’s need for a room of her own in which 
she can be free to think for herself, study, write, or pursue 
other interests away from the oppression of patriarchal societal 
expectations and demands. Through library-based research, I 
identify four screens in Woolf’s work through which she viewed 
and critiqued culture, and I use these screens to 
reconceptualize “a room of one’s own” in 21st Century terms. I 
determine that the new “room” is intimately and intricately 
technological and textual and it is reformulated in the digital 
spaces of blogs, social media, and Web sites. Further, I 
introduce the new concept of the technologized politically 
embodied cyborg, or TPEC, and examine the ways 21st Century TPECs 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING THE TECHNOLOGIZED POLITICALLY EMBODIED 
CYBORG (TPEC): THE TPEC AND THE SCREEN AND THE SCREENING OF 
WOOLF 
 
Born and dead too soon 
Troubled gender writing faith 
Genius vision drowned 
 
Amy Barnickel (2010) 
Haiku Biography of Virginia Woolf  
 
I always have been drawn to studying women and the various 
contexts in which they interact with and are influenced by the 
myriad of texts and technologies that they encounter in their 
day-to-day lives. Primarily, I study these phenomena by 
screening them through the lenses of literature and feminism. I 
analyze the 20th century text, A Room of One’s Own, by Virginia 
Woolf (2005), and I connect what troubled her about women’s 
lives to what continues to weigh on my mind about them. Most 
specifically, I engage with Woolf’s concept of a woman’s need 
for a room of her own in which she can be free to think for 
herself, study, write, or pursue other interests away from the 
oppression of patriarchal societal expectations and demands. To 
build on Woolf’s conceptualization of a space and a place for 
this type of womanly activity, I theorize a 21st Century 
reconceptualization of a room of one’s own and determine that 




textual, and feminist, and this century’s digital cultural 
feminists are using it to promote woman-friendly ideas and 
empower themselves and others in interesting, effective, and 
creative ways through everyday activism in blogs, social media, 
and Web sites. 
Virginia Woolf and I agree that some women’s issues cannot 
be resolved within existing western patriarchal culture. And, in 
some ways, blogs, social media, and Web sites by women can and 
do promote anti-feminist and quite stereotypical portrayals of 
women. But the history of feminism includes struggles with aims 
that may seemingly be at odds with each other but are necessary 
parts of the overall historical movement. For example, in 2009, 
Thomas H. Ford remarked that “on the one hand, the rhetoric of 
motherhood has been a central target in the feminist project of 
exposing and repudiating the cultural logics that perpetuate the 
oppression of women. And on the other, feminists have turned to 
this same rhetoric when reflecting on the development of 
feminism itself” (189). I acknowledge similar aspects of women’s 
activity on the World Wide Web, but my primary focus in this 
dissertation is the women who advance knowledge of women’s 
issues and actively live their lives in ways that I believe 
Woolf would have admired. The women you will read about in this 




write and participate in a cultural dialogue that values them 
and their work. I also argue that 21st century technologies 
offer avenues for the promotion of feminist ideals through a 
variety of feminist textualities, and they can lead to higher 
than present levels of cultural participation and influence by 
women through various forms of writing that employ technological 
tools.  
I necessarily offer explanations of my understanding and 
use of a number of important terms that I use throughout this 
dissertation. Woolf thought of words as ever-changing, shifting, 
and resistant to definition. I honor her relationship with words 
and her sentiments about them, so it is important to me that I 
share the meaning that I intend when I use and re-use certain 
terms in this dissertation. Further, the terms that are defined 
in this introduction have been particularly troublesome for 
women. Their meanings have been constructed through the 
influences of culture, literature, politics, and more, so it is 
important to me to acknowledge their and my situations 
(situatedness) within U.S. culture and the academy through which 






The Screening of Woolf 
 
Virginia Woolf was an early feminist textual activist. 
Woolf’s examples of technological textuality are models for 
current-era breakthroughs for women who seek a non-patriarchal 
literary and aesthetic authority and use feminist textual 
technological textuality to influence the world in personal, 
cultural, political, and global ways.  
  In this dissertation, I use the framework of four screens 
that literary author Virginia Woolf used in her cultural 
critiques to analyze critical, theoretical, and historical works 
that relate to feminism, some aspects of social science, and 
epistemology. I show how Woolf presciently wrote about timeless 
women’s issues that resonate in today’s digital culture and in 
some ways I resolve or at least address the concerns she 
expressed in her essays and literary works. Finally, I show how 
these texts and theories inform women in contemporary U.S. 
culture who use textual technologies for activist purposes and 
to promote feminist ideals. 
As an extension and further analysis of Gubar’s (2005) 
observations and especially of Woolf’s own writing, I analyze 
Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own (2005) using four screens. In some 




technological screen would if complicated by intense analysis 
and interference. Although the Woolfian screens resist 
categorization and linear models, they are useful as an 
explanatory tool, and I think that their straightforwardness 
will aid the reader in understanding the shifts that take place 
when conformative, linear, rational, standardized, traditional 
textual composition becomes intentionally and unintentionally 
layered, personal, fluid, and ultimately activist through the 
use of 21st Century technologies.  
 The four activist screens in Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own 
(2005) are: sex, sexuality, and gender; aesthetics; misogyny and 
the economics of enough; and epistemology. In the chapters that 
invoke these screens, I demonstrate Woolf’s introduction of 
these concepts by using her own textual examples. Additionally, 
I show interesting examples of activist writing that experiment 
with a variety of approaches that engender similar thoughts and 
ideas but that are expressed on Web sites, via Facebook, and in 
blogs that use virtual spaces to evoke a cyber-culture imagined, 
image-rich, feminist screen of one’s own. I believe that Woolf 
would have encouraged my approach to analyzing her work. She 
often stated that reflection on difficult subjects was important 
to understanding one’s own identity and one’s cultural context. 




societies, mirrors are essential to all violent and heroic 
action” (35), she understood the value of reflective practice 
and analysis. 
  By employing these screens, I expose pervasive and 
discursive systems that encourage and discourage women’s active 
involvement with and influence on culture through their use of 
Internet technologies. For example, some methods of ‘scientific’ 
data collection are flawed from a feminist perspective. They may 
inadvertently or intentionally influence the results of an 
ostensibly objective, empirical study because of pervasive but 
often unrecognized biases, assumptions, and power dynamics (such 
as homogeneity). In the area of cognitive science, I examine 
epistemology, or how we know what we know, and I illuminate the 
work of feminist scientists who are revolutionizing and 
deconstructing previously concretized scientific facts about the 
brain, the mind, and the body. I respond to and disrupt cultural 
dynamics that influence how women are able to function within 
digital culture, such as the availability of resources, 
financial autonomy, the patriarchal environment of U.S. culture, 
and the favor of masculine aesthetics, which Woolf wrote about 
and very keenly understood well before the age of the Internet, 





The Technologized Politically Embodied Cyborg (TPEC) 
 
  I introduce the concept and definition of the TPEC early in 
this dissertation because I think it is important to situate the 
TPEC and its relationship with the other terms in this 
introduction. With an early understanding of what the TPEC is, 
the reader of this dissertation should be able to share the 
nuances of meaning that I provide in the remaining important 
terms. 
 There are many reasons to embrace the expansive ideas that 
were put forward in Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s (1991) The 
Embodied Mind. The doors to understanding the world and the way 
humans know it no longer need to be locked by the polarizing 
notions of scientific secrecy or metaphysical mysticism. The 
keys are available, and humans need only use them. Another way 
of phrasing this might be, humans need only become them. In the 
TPEC’s room of her own, technological tools are no longer just 
prostheses; they are essential, embodied elements of the TPEC’s 
position and place in the world. So, when technological tools 
become so ingrained in the make-up of a TPEC—body, mind, 
environment, space, and place—they can no longer be 
characterized as being “used.” TPECs are in various stages of 




idea well when he wrote, “If mind and body belong together, as 
do body and brain, so do brain and world” (3). These are 
relational concepts that integrate with one another, cross-
inform, and adapt, and they require an acknowledgment and 
acceptance of the particularity of any observable phenomenon or 
bit of knowledge. Moreover, by approaching scientific inquiry in 
this way, especially as science relates to the brain and mind, 
political maneuvers that enforce the cultural marginalizing that 
is brokered by the perpetuation of all sorts of binaries such as 
male/female, reason/emotion, universal/particular, and more, can 
be returned to their more legitimate places on the spectra of 
which they are a part.  
But the restructuring of the way western culture conducts 
scientific studies is just one way to progress toward embodied 
science. In another way, western culture needs to set itself 
free from antiquated notions that hold metaphysics, language, 
and culture separate and distinct from the realm of science and 
solely in the hands of the white male academic authority. 
Indeed, because of the inclusiveness inherent in situatedness 
and embodiment, it is imperative that, as Dougherty (2001) 
states, “If such studies of man and society are finally to be 
free of the taint of their old association with philosophy and 




is only one true way for them to achieve legitimacy: they must 
become physical sciences”(92).  
Dougherty’s claim is critical to the TPEC’s evolution as a 
being that embodies the technological, fleshy, and spatial in 
relationships with each other. Similarly, Dougherty believes 
science must become a relational construct with 
philosophy/metaphysics/religion/culture, and 
philosophy/metaphysics/religion/culture must become relational 
constructs with physical sciences. Hayles (2002) further 
supports this claim when she states: 
Beginning with relation rather than preexisting 
entities changes everything. It enables us to see that 
embodied experience comes not only from the complex 
interlay between brain and viscera that Antonio R. 
Damasio compellingly describes in Descartes’ Error: 
Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, but also from 
the constant engagement of our embodied interactions 
with the environment. Abstract ideas of the body 
likewise arise from the interplay between prevailing 
cultural formations and the beliefs, observations, and 
experiences that count as empirical evidence in a 
given society. In this view, embodiment and the body 
are emergent phenomena arising from the dynamic flux 
that we try to understand analytically by parsing it 
into such concepts as biology and culture, evolution 
and technology(298). 
 
 Hayles (2002) goes on to say that this interplay between 
environment, enculturations, and empirical evidence resulting in 
categorical enculturations do not happen overnight—they take 




with which humans adapt and change (slow) and the rate at which 
technology changes and progresses (rapid), ultimately the TPEC 
(the posthuman, to Hayles) will emerge. In this regard, Hayles 
(2002) remarks,  
The posthuman, whether understood as a biological 
organism or a cyborg seamlessly joined with 
intelligent machines, is seen as a construction that 
participates in distributed cognition dispersed 
throughout the body and the environment. Agency still 
exists, but for the posthuman it becomes a distributed 
function. Consciousness for the posthuman ceases to be 
seen as the seat of identity and becomes instead an 
epiphenomenon, a late evolutionary add-on whose 
principal function is to narrate just-so stories that 
often have little to do with what is actually 
happening (319). 
 
 In my view, Hayles’ (2002) assertion that agency for 
technological beings is a distributed function supports my 
vision for a TPEC culture. Further, she states, “Here the 
posthuman is embraced as the occasion to rethink the mind/body 
split and the premise that mind and body, like the rest of the 
world, preexist our experiences of them. As we have seen, the 
relational stance . . . puts the emphasis instead on dynamic 
interactive processes from which both mindbody and world emerge 
together” (320). In other words, culture can no longer develop 
alongside technology or vice versa—humans and machines are 
becoming one and the same, and therefore, the TPEC is integrated 




binarial relationships that in patriarchy have marginalized 
women. 
 Ultimately, the TPEC world will embrace feminist theories 
and related cognitive theories such as those proposed in The 
Embodied Mind. That world will further incorporate the 
interdisciplinary conjunctures that inform feminism and embodied 
cognition, such as philosophy, psychology, metaphysics, 
aesthetics, literature and language, and technology, and it will 
understand them through accessible theories such as Dougherty’s 
(2001) re-use of Balkin’s cultural software and Blackmore’s 
selfplex, Hayles’(2002) mindbody, Wolfe’s (2005) social brain, 
Ramachandran’s (1998) body/mind/brain, Haraway’s (1991) situated 
scientist, Clark’s (1997) extended mind, and Woolf’s (2005) man-
woman/woman-man. In the age of the TPEC, formerly exclusive 
science- and technology-related fields can be broached through a 
situated, embodied feminist technological screen, and expanded 
acceptable ways of knowing the world will result from the 
practice. 
Throughout this dissertation, I divulge that the room of 
one’s own that Woolf envisioned for women is, in the 21st 
Century, a textual and technological screen located in a 
physical and ethereal, embodied and prosthetic space/place. 




not have been investigated before: some 21st Century 
technologies, such as Web sites, Facebook pages, and blogs, are 
social AND solitary. They have melded the binarial notion of 
either/or by transgressing the binarial notion of social and 
solitary as opposites. TPECs who write in these environments are 
effectively writing “poetically and prosaically at one and the 
same moment” (Woolf 44). They are on their way toward figuring 
out how women can achieve in a new way the ideal of having a 
room of one’s own for personal growth, promotion of feminist 
ideas, and greater participation and influence on culture. The 
paradigm shift is interesting and important because TPECs 
incorporate these ostensibly social technologies in very 
personal and intimate ways. In other words, in using newer 
social technologies, women are effectively employing the 
isolationist aspects of the practices associated with 
technologies and therefore living out Woolf’s admonition for 
isolation, but they also embrace the connectivity and community 
that writing in a “public” space affords. In some ways, TPECs 
using technological tools in this way is an extension of the 
early feminist adage, “the personal is political.” This phrase 
is indicative of what the TPECs are writing about: personal 
issues that they grapple with and feel oppressed by but that 




This phenomenon will be elaborated on through the examples 
analyzed in subsequent chapters. 
Though the TPEC’s functions, boundaries, and cultural 
phenomena are complex and problematic because they emerge from 
patriarchy, they transgress formalized, patriarchal structures 
that have been ingrained into western culture, and they move 
feminism forward. In other words, the room of one’s own is 
within the TPEC as well as it is a creation of the TPEC. Space 
and place, as seen through the screens of the TPEC, follow 
different and ever-changing rules. The room of one’s own is a 
technological screen that is located in physical, ethereal, and 
possibly other realms. 
 
The TPEC and Interdisciplinarity  
 
The TPEC has a place among many theoretical heuristics. In 
this dissertation, I identify the discourses of “social 
relations, identity, knowledge, and power [that] are constructed 
through written and spoken texts” (Luke section 1, ¶1), that are 
produced in digital environments, and that affect and are 
affected by women’s participation in them. By drawing from 
cultural and feminist theory, I make clear the distinctions I 




(individually and collectively) and the cultural traditions that 
support or restrict them. These concepts are related, but they 
elicit distinct analyses that add nuance to the suggestions I 
make and the possibilities I perceive for women who write and 
act in digital environments.  
Further, one of the many identities of Virginia Woolf was 
rhetor. In other words, she wrote persuasive arguments on a 
number subjects, including the education of women, literature, 
economics, mental health, and others. In doing so, she sometimes 
used experimental styles that may have camouflaged in some ways 
her very progressive ideas about women and their intellectual 
abilities. Virginia Woolf, I argue, used and appreciated a 
variety of approaches to rhetoric that did not necessarily 
conform to traditional, male-standardized styles, such as the 
essay, or even persuasive articles. Woolf was able to subvert 
patriarchal cultural expectations of writing through her 
appreciation and use of non-linear, experimental writing styles. 
In doing so, she enacted covert political statements about 
western culture and what could and should be expected of women.  
Her own experimentation and her appreciation for it in 
others’ writing reminds me of what Barthes (1977) refers to in 
his essay “Third Meaning” and elsewhere in Image, Music, Text as 




knowledge, information: analytically, it has something derisory 
about it . . . indifferent to moral or aesthetic categories . . 
. it is on the side of the carnival” (55). In A Room of One’s 
Own, Woolf records emphatically the exquisite moment during 
which she realized what it meant to her and for literature in 
general that Mary Carmichael “tamper[ed] with the expected 
sequence” (80) when she wrote the simple three words, “Chloe 
liked Olivia” (80). For Woolf, the brazen while at the same time 
subtle “third meaning” of these words broke women away from the 
cultural, sociological, and rhetorical necessity to exist only 
in relation to men or maleness. With these words, Woolf 
remarked, “Mary Carmichael set to work to catch those unrecorded 
gestures, those unsaid or half-said words, which form 
themselves, no more palpably than the shadows of moths on the 
ceiling, when women are alone, unlit by the capricious and 
coloured light of the other sex” (83). In other words, Woolf 
recognized exactly what Barthes (1977) desired: the importance 
of third meaning. Further, for Woolf, the effect that this third 
meaning brought forward was more complex than these few words on 
a page might suggest: its statement transformed words into an 
image, an image of women lifted into a space of freedom of 





Additionally, Foucault and Derrida, who are discourse 
theorists, assert that “language and discourse are not 
transparent or neutral means for describing or analyzing the 
social and biological world. Rather they effectively construct, 
regulate and control knowledge, social relations and 
institutions” (Luke section 2, ¶2). Derrida’s idea of “signing 
my proper name” in his work critically informs feminist 
technological textuality and the TPEC. Additionally, the French 
feminist writer, social critic, and activist, Luce Irigaray 
(1985) uses similar terminology when she claims in her essay, 
“This Sex Which Is Not One,” that, historically, woman has been 
denied a definition of her own and that indeed, she has “no 
proper name” (251). In Chapter Four, I elaborate further on 
these concepts and analyze some TPEC writing that, in my view, 
expands on these concepts to create meaning for women using 
technology for feminist activism. 
Ultimately, Woolf (2005), Haraway (1991), Barthes (1977), 
Derrida (1978, 1982), and Irigaray (1985) acknowledge that 
writing needs to be freed from chronology, an established 
literary format, a predetermined meaning, or other 
organizational device that prohibits the reader and text from 
encountering the other on their own terms. For example, it may 




follow a seemingly insignificant thread for his thoughts than it 
would for him to construct a logical, planned, incremental 
argument because the point of interruption of routine or 
trajectory is often the moment when an innovative idea will 
occur. When a writer proceeds along a pre-set path, she pays 
less attention to ideas that lie along the periphery of the 
writing subject. Intervening in the momentum of that 
straightforwardness can yield new insights and ideas. This can 
be done in any way that is appealing to the author. For example, 
she may write a poem or Haiku such as the one I wrote at the 
beginning of this chapter. Then, using the words and the few 
syllables that make up the poem, the feminist textual 
technological activist may choose to “google” the terms to 
discover associations among them that she may not have been 
aware of before. Choosing and researching further some of those 
associative findings may reveal insights into patriarchal 
cultural assumptions and practices that affect women negatively, 
and which may inspire the TPEC to perform an act of 
technological textuality.  
Upon first encounter, this type of experimentation in 
writing seems strange, random, or even silly, but its value is 
great—if for no other reason than its instantaneous disruption 




writing structure. Barthes conducted similar textual experiments 
with his works S/Z and Image, Music, Text, along with his essay 
on third meaning in which he introduces the concepts of the 
readerly and writerly texts. Woolf used similar techniques to 
engender her own writing, and in doing so she performed landmark 
textual acts that still resonate in contemporary western digital 
culture. 
 Additionally, biographers and scholars have noted often 
that Virginia Woolf was aware of and familiar with the work of 
Sigmund Freud, one of the world’s most renowned psychologists 
and the originator of psychoanalysis. And though many Freudian 
theories have since been proven suspect or obsolete, interesting 
and useful Freudian-inspired writing methods inform the TPEC and 
are similar to the approaches to writing that Woolf used and 
promoted to other women who would write. For example, Freud’s 
approach to “dream work” (1952) evokes comparison to Woolf’s 
admonition that “it is in our idleness, in our dreams, that the 
submerged truth sometimes comes to the top” (Woolf 2005 31). 
Similarly, Freud used in his psychoanalytic practice of dream 
work “the rule of giving equal notice to everything” (357) in 
which the therapist and the patient (and for my purposes, the 
writer) “should simply listen, and not bother about whether he 




Freudian dream-work writing methods, she considers “foreground 
and background, conditions, digressions, and illustrations, 
chains of evidence and counterarguments” (Freud 40). 
Interestingly, Woolf also wrote, “we need to skip and saunter, 
to suspend judgment, to lounge and loaf down the alleys and bye-
streets of letters” (Lee 407). Lee states that Woolf also 
described “her roaming and observations in London streets (on 
her way to buy a pencil) as a form of reading. She becomes ‘an 
enormous eye’ which can leave ‘I’ behind, leave the ‘tether’ of 
a ‘single mind’ and ‘the straight lines of personality,’ and 
deviate into the bodies and minds of others’” (407), which 
further echoes and expands on Freud’s dream work approach. 
Additionally, writing using the methodology of the dream 
work helps the writer and the reader by making it more obvious 
that “each train of thought is almost invariably accompanied by 
its contradictory counterpart” (Freud 40), and “the logical 
links which have hitherto held the psychical material together 
are lost” (Freud 41). In dream work, this loss is not a bad 
thing but a liberating condition that allows associative 
thoughts, ideas, and ways of understanding to emerge. What 
becomes important for scholarly dream work are the break in 
associative thought patterns, the interruption of assumed 




Freudian dream work writing and Woolf’s idling, daydreaming 
method are the opposites of patriarchal academic, linear, 
formulaic approaches in which the writer pre-formulates a 
hypothesis and sets about to prove it. Engendering dream work 
and Woolfian writing entails conducting crucial analysis on the 
non-obvious or the formerly neglected detail. I use contemporary 
examples of similarly-third-meaning-laden words, Freudian dream 
work inspired method, and Woolf-like idleness to demonstrate how 
women who write in digital formats evoke the obtuse meanings of 
our time that may seem simple but may transform their roles in 
U.S. culture. 
The TPEC’s Scope 
 
The observations and arguments put forward in this 
dissertation are centralized to U.S. culture specifically, and 
western culture generally, and I recognize that this limits the 
scope of the project. Because of concerns for time and space, I 
do not treat every aspect of western nor non-western cultures 
and their sometimes drastically different conditions relating to 
women, writing, and the various technologies that influence 
them. In fact, eighty percent of the rest of the world “still 
lacks basic communication infrastructure, and two-thirds of the 




Technologies 1997). So I want to acknowledge at least on some 
level that the disparate treatment of women, women’s writing, 
and women’s participation in writing and other creative pursuits 
in U.S. culture, though very important and critical in my view 
to the progress of women globally, must be weighed against 
realities such as those identified above that many of the 
world’s citizens continue to endure. 
 
Masculinity and Femininity 
 
 I refer to masculinity and femininity as cultural terms 
that include sex (genitalia), gender (western traditional male 
and female roles), and cultural connotations that include power, 
intelligence, dominance, and place within hierarchical social 
structures. In masculinity, sexuality is external, dominant, and 
sometimes violent. In femininity, sexuality is internal, 
vulnerable, and passive. Masculine and masculinity are more 
highly valued in western culture, and feminine and femininity 
are undervalued, often to the point of ridicule. For example, it 
is valuable (for men, but not for women) in many western 
contexts to be physically strong, loud- and low-voiced, dominant 
over others, and in charge—attributes that are generally 




desirable (for men and for women) to be soft-spoken and higher-
pitched, weak-muscled, petite, and cooperative—attributes that 
are generally associated with women.  
 These traits become problematic for women and men who 
exhibit counter-gender-stereotypical qualities in dominant 
cultural contexts. For example, a woman may be criticized for 
having a low voice or large muscles, or a man may be 
marginalized for having a high-pitched voice or diminutive size. 
Even greater cultural pressure is wielded against individuals 
who gender-identify as a gender different from the one that 
their sexual organs indicate. 
 Therefore, understanding these terms is important to 
comprehending my position that technologies, especially since 
the industrial revolution, have been and continue to be 
gendered, and they are gendered because they developed in 
patriarchal social and economic systems. In particular, computer 
technology is inherently masculine because it was and continues 
to be developed within a culture that values masculinity over 
femininity or other identifications. And therefore, it follows 
that computer-generated or influenced texts embed masculine 
features that require examination at deep levels and exposure by 




 Throughout this dissertation, I critique the masculine and 
feminine influences on textual technologies and I divulge their 
confluences. I draw from a variety of feminist models to inform 
my understanding of these terms and their constructions. African 
American and womanist feminisms, for example, insist that 
gender, class, race, differing abilities, and other factors 
should be considered when texts and technologies are developed 
for users. They ask that scientists, authors, or other creators 
consider “how and under what conditions the technology will be 
used” (Rosser 6) and that the consumer of the technology or text 
be included in the design and shape of the product. Radical 
feminists might agree that users should help design technologies 
according to their needs and wishes, but radical feminists might 
also say that doing so is not possible for women because 
maleness, masculinity, and patriarchy are so “intertwined with 
technology and computer systems in our society” (Rosser 11) that 
no woman-centered technology or text could possibly exist within 
that framework. These theories collide with traditional 
canonical literature of all kinds, and much has been written and 
debated about which works should be included in literary canons 
because of these inherent inequalities and marginalizations.  
In this dissertation, I agree with Woolf that women should 




themselves. For Woolf, writing as one’s self does not mean 
writing as a woman or writing in a feminine way. In Woolf’s 
view, “it is fatal for anyone who writes to think of their sex. 
It is fatal to be a man or woman pure and simple. One must be 
woman-manly or man-womanly” (Woolf 2005 103). I draw on this 
avenue of discussion in Woolf’s writing when I divulge and 
dissect the complexities, possibilities, and dangers of writing 
in digital and Web-based environments in which, presumably, 
women find it (easier, more fulfilling, acceptable, accessible?) 
to establish themselves as “woman-manly or man-womanly” authors 
who, by virtue of the technological environment, are ostensibly 
free from societal norms and expectations. In this regard, the 
literature is mixed, with some scholars heralding the 
androgynous nature of the World Wide Web and other digital 
environments. Other scholars, including some feminist theorists, 
condemn the Internet for polarizing the sexes and reaffirming 
sexist stereotypes and social constructs. Even more 
interestingly, this body-mind complexity is supported by 
cognitive scientists such as Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991), 
who substantiate their multivariant heuristic for epistemology, 
which I elaborate on further in Chapter Seven. I use the theory 
of situated, embodied cognition that they put forth to delve 




cognitive theory, how the brain and mind formulate what women 
know and how they come to know it. I suggest that researching 
the brain and mind in this way is critical to establishing that 
feminist approaches are valid, worthy, and revealing means 
through which reality and the truth of the nature of the western 
world can be divulged.  
There is support for my assertions among other cognitive 
scientists as well, and indeed, the very definition of cognitive 
science that is offered by Hubert Dreyfus in his essay 
“Cognitivism Abandoned,” (1995) indicates that cognitive science 
is a multidisciplinary field and would welcome this diversified 
approach to analyzing women’s technological lives. Dreyfus 
defined the term cognitive science in a very understandable and 
approachable way, and his definition is the one that I maintain 
in my discussion. Dreyfus stated, “Cognitive science is any 
attempt to explain how the mind and brain produce intelligent 
behavior . . . it’s just the name for a natural confluence of 
all the disciplines that study the mind-brain: philosophy, 
linguistics, computer science, anthropology, neuroscience, 
psychology” (72). And I believe that Dreyfus would agree that 
feminist theory; theories of texts and technology deserve a 




 Further, many older constructs of how humans know things or 
how knowledge is produced are based on the positivist model of 
science that supports the notion that genius, eureka-like 
discoveries are rare and that knowledge is built in incremental 
stages that work toward some ultimate truth about the world. But 
at least since the 1990s, cognitive scientists such as Clark 
(1997, 2003) and Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1991) have begun to 
acknowledge what feminists have argued for a very long time: 
what we know (or what we think we know) is based on our 
situation, our particular experiences, and the social constructs 
(Wittig 1992) that influence the way we think and behave. 
Because of the multiplicity of influences on our ways of 
knowing, I argue that epistemology must abandon old notions such 
as disciplines or fields that segregate sciences from art, for 
example, or literature from technology, and embrace an 
interdisciplinarity that promotes an understanding that for most 
truths there are exceptions and that most exceptions expose some 
type of marginalization, erasure, or compromise, and often, 
those effects are based on gender. With this notion I connect 
and show how feminist theories and theories of knowing converge 
and how these can enlighten what 21st century feminists are 





For example, in very interesting ways, Katherine Hayles 
(1990, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2008), whom I consider an 
epistemologist, a feminist, and a scholar of technology and 
literature, especially and expertly intersects the realms of 
textual technologies and cognitive theory in ingenious ways that 
provide insight into embodiment issues that were important to 
Woolf and remain critical to current culture. Woolf was 
incredibly astute in screening the world through the history and 
reality of the people who read and write. As a woman denied a 
formal education, she was already keenly aware in 1929 of a fact 
that Vanevar Bush observed in “As We May Think,” which was 
originally published nearly twenty years later in 1948, that the 
library (the great bastion and icon of formal higher education), 
even the great libraries, are not “adequate maps of knowledge” 
(Murray 3), especially with regard to the history, 




 Patriarchy is the systemic, systematic, governmental, 
communal, and familial domination of virtually everything by 
men. Patriarchy is a cultural construct that values masculinity 




hierarchies over all others. And it is also a system that 
devalues women and the feminine. In fact, its opposite, 
matriarchy, rarely, if ever, exists in the larger contexts of 
communities and societies.  
 Historically, cultures that valued the “organic, female 
world view” (Kilbourne & Weeks 246) have existed, but since the 
industrial revolution, patriarchal values have taken hold in 
almost all cultures—western, Asian, middle eastern, African, and 
others—and have escaped much criticism. I agree with Kilbourne & 
Weeks (1997) that patriarchy values the mechanical and sanctions 
the scientific, material control and domination of nature and 
women and that U.S. culture is entrenched in patriarchy. 
 In this dissertation, I critique some of the patriarchal 
societal conditions that affect women and their ability to 
participate fully in the emerging textual technological society 
of the west. Identifying my understanding of patriarchy is 
necessary to help readers see some of the difficulties involved 
with women’s participation with texts and technologies, 
especially Internet technologies. For example, a common 
assertion about the World Wide Web is that its technological 
environments are great gender equalizers—that men and women are 
free of gender roles, sexual identifications, and other societal 




other words, this technology is not simply an instrument or a 
means of production, but its essence is a construct itself of 
societal values, dominant cultural norms, patriarchal 
hierarchies, and other influences. In cyber environments, 
ostensibly women can be men and vice versa, or each can be non-
human, partially-human, cyborg, or even another species 
altogether. That assertion may sound believable and even benign, 
but unless it is examined by uncovering and exposing the 
patriarchal values that allow people to operate in cyberspace in 
cross-gendered ways, we may not know that research has also 
shown that gender stereotypes, aggressive behavior, and other 
patriarchal cultural signifiers are meted out in cyberspace just 
as they are in ‘real’ life. In fact, the stereotypical 
differences among genders, for example, are sometimes magnified 




 My general understanding and definition of the term 
essentialism is that it describes a certain group of beliefs 
that claim that many things, animals, and humans have 
undeniable, basic qualities that are always present in their 




suppress or mask those qualities or encourage expression of 
others. When I use the term with regard to my feminist critiques 
of various issues, I understand it to mean that U.S. culture in 
particular and western culture in general, which dominate many 
of the world’s environments in their cultural pervasiveness and 
ubiquity (English language is the world’s default language, 
money in all financial realms is valued in comparison with the 
dollar, white skinned, thin female bodies are idealized, etc.). 
These cultural dominations include technology in many respects, 
because many technologies assume women’s qualities at their 
supposed very basic human level when women’s capabilities, 
attitudes, intellect, and competence are considered.  
 Further, because of the entrenched cultural values begun in 
The Enlightenment, western culture has established certain 
universal characteristics of maleness and femaleness. Some among 
many possible examples are the essentialistic notions of 
dichotomies that assume certain male and female relationships 
such as male:culture, female:nature. And, in a patriarchal 
western society as I have described above, maleness and culture 
also mean power, privilege, and freedom; femaleness and nature 
also mean restricted usefulness and boundary-enforced existence. 
Deeply embedded understandings such as these are very difficult 




negotiate when technologies have the potential to allow their 
borders to be permeated. For example, women’s bodies have been 
some of the first to incorporate technological prostheses, and 
our culture manipulates women’s bodies through medical 
technologies every day--breast implants are an obvious example, 
but other examples from the medical field are infertility 
treatments and cesarean births. Societal conflicts arise from 
technologizing the natural, or essential, woman, and they begin 
to emerge and cause tension when members of western culture 
realize that to be technological is to be at the forefront of 
creativity, production, information, and power—the things that 
more typically make up majority culture or the masculine 
essential--but are now also deployed in large measure by women 




Throughout this dissertation, my arguments are informed by 
Donna J. Haraway’s Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention 
of Nature (1991), which heavily influences my views on feminist 
technological textuality. Haraway’s and Woolf’s works recognize 
and repudiate dualisms such as male/female and body/mind, and 




textual technological feminist activists and me, and all of us 
acknowledge in our writing the importance and examination of 
embodiment.  
Embodiment, especially as it relates to a woman’s place in 
the world and also as it relates to writing, voice, agency, and 
being acknowledged as human, is a critical element of textual 
technologies. Embodiment is a relational term—and as mentioned 
earlier, even the notion of the term woman is relational; women 
and women’s bodies have almost always been understood as, by 
many definitions, what they are not (Irigaray 1985), or what 
they lack as compared to men and men’s bodies. There is 
negativity associated with the womanly or feminine qualities: 
weak, not strong; feeling, not thinking; hysterical, not 
rational. The woman’s body itself in Freudian terms is the 
castrated male—somehow undeveloped, incomplete, and lacking 
because it has no phallus. Woolf agreed when she wrote, “almost 
without exception they are shown in their relation to men . . . 
[they] were . . . seen only in relation to the other sex” (81). 
Donna Haraway (1991) clearly elaborated the fact that 
embodiment has historically been used to marginalize women as 
incapable of the scientific ideal of distance, objectivity, and 
externality. For example, in her “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, 




Century,” Haraway (1991) describes the cyborg in a way 
reminiscent of Woolf’s description of the ideal woman writer who 
is man-womanly or woman-manly. And Haraway (1991) goes further 
by introducing the concept of the technologized body into the 
description when she states, “The cyborg is a matter of fiction 
and lived experience that changes what counts as women’s 
experience . . . this is a struggle over life and death, but the 
boundary between science fiction and social reality is an 
optical illusion” (149). Their ideals are similar and both Woolf 
(2005) and Haraway (1991) acknowledge the necessary 
transgression of boundaries as well as the harmful nature of 
dualisms that impede women’s progress, activity, and 
participation in their cultures. The similarity and urgency of 
Woolf’s and Haraway’s arguments in this regard make a bridge 
between the literature of Woolf and the science and technology 
of Haraway that I find useful for understanding technological 
textuality and its digitization of the concept of a room of 
one’s own in the 21st century in the form of Web sites, Facebook 
accounts, and blogs. 
It is important to note that one of the newest, most 
challenging forms of feminism has sprung directly out of 
computer and Internet technology: Cyberfeminism. Cyberfeminism 




new information and communications technologies for empowerment” 
(Millar 200). Cyberfeminism also positions these technologies as 
“inherently liberatory” (Millar 200) because women are “uniquely 
suited to life in the digital age” (Millar 200) because of their 
socialization toward relationships, networking, and community-
building, which are also concepts that underlie computer coding 
and Internet navigation and usage. 
 
Embodiment and Power 
 
Finally, if people in western culture are to begin to think 
about writing, scholarship, and ways of knowing as always-
already1 embodied, then proper attention has to be given to how 
embodiment is related to power and how power relates to women’s 
agency. Women’s bodies have historically been objectified and 
commodified by patriarchal systems. Irigaray makes this point in 
her essay “This Sex Which is Not One” (1985), which I mentioned 
earlier. It is very difficult for women to gain agency for 
themselves when the very bodies that they have to move around in 
                       
1 I don’t want to spend an undue amount of time unpacking the use of the term 
“always-already,” especially because there is some controversy over the 
originator of the term. Generally, when I use this term, I refer to it in a 
Derridian sense, which means that though there may be a perceived or 
generally accepted beginning to some phenomenon or event, typically, when the 
phenomenon or event involves expectations of women, there are other forces 




are immobilized, negated, neglected, and ignored. From her 
specific example of compulsory heterosexuality’s literal 
splitting of the female body (through the heterosexual sex act) 
and rendering it a mere vessel for a man to her more 
philosophical idea that before women can be liberated they must 
physically, culturally, and in other tactical and practical ways 
separate themselves from men and their patriarchal systems of 
domination, Irigaray proposes radical moves that disrupt 
traditional power dynamics.  
In another way, Aimee Carrillo Rowe (2005) adds to the 
discussion of embodiment and agency by suggesting that women 
have also become adept at negotiating their identities based on 
the politics of their location and their relation to the 
environment in which they act—what she calls “belonging” (28). 
For example, Carillo Rowe takes apart the idea of ‘home’—a 
concept that carries with it assumptions of safety, insularity, 
comfort, and ease, but that, for women, often delivers an 
environment contrary to those ideals and that changes her level 
of agency and her understanding of her identity. Carrillo Rowe 
also acknowledges that women constantly negotiate their sense of 
belonging, and that the negotiations “are all functions of 
power” (16). She argues that although standpoint theory such as 




idea, a more nuanced way to interrogate discourse is to examine 
the belonging in which one’s standpoint is “placed in motion” 
(28) and offers the “possibility for the formation of critical 
and collective modes of agency as well as new demands for 
accountability” (28). In the example of home, above, the word 
carries with it white, heterosexual, and nuclear familial 
assumptions that are so embedded in the term that they may go 
completely unrecognized by the powerful white majority in the 
U.S., but they carry with them great amounts of power and 
dismissal for women who don’t ‘belong’ in that definition. In 
other words, standpoint recognition is not enough to explain our 
situatedness; accountability for complicity in unspoken 
privileges is also important to feminist work and it is a 
critical factor in the amount of agency a woman can access. In 
contrast to Irigaray, Carrillo Rowe’s ‘belonging’ is much less 
utopian and in my view, it furthers the discussion of 
situatedness and brings practicality into this philosophical 
discussion surrounding the TPEC and feminist technological 
textuality. Additionally, belonging adds nuance to the always-
alreadiness of embodiment. 
Carrillo Rowe’s work moves toward what Claire Colebrook 
(1997) seems to have been looking for when she wrote “Feminist 




whether a feminist philosophy can even exist apart from being 
defined, much as Irigaray argued about women, by what it is not. 
Carrillo Rowe’s insistence on acknowledging one’s ‘belonging’ is 
one way of moving toward what Colebrook calls the “truly 
philosophical . . . less gender-biased . . . privileged notions—
of reason, subjectivity, rights, and so on” (80). Colebrook 
argues (and she claims that Heidegger also does) that western 
philosophies have traditionally disregarded difference, and in 
so doing, have contributed to the perpetuation of patriarchal 
power dynamics. What Colebrook and Carrillo Rowe have in common 
is their ultimate insistence that “philosophy may not just be a 
question of ideality, pure truth, universalizable ethics, and 
transcendental conditions” (Colebrook 95) and that a feminist 
philosophy would not be “philosophy’s essential other” 
(Colebrook 95) but would be one among many. 
These are some examples of how feminist theorists approach 
the probing questions that Virginia Woolf asked about her 
culture and the status of women. These juxtapositions indicate 
that real problems still exist regardless of how careful and 
inclusive a philosophy or theory attempts to be: who remains 
excluded? Who is forgotten? which constructions of the term 
‘women’ are being left out of the discourses that dominate? For 




intertwined, interconnected, and inseparable. That is why the 
issue of women’s agency is so difficult to sort out and 
negotiate. But I think that, at least for many women in the U.S. 
who have access to computers, education, employment, and other 
relative freedoms such as sexuality and religion, part of the 
key to increased agency is their participation in emerging 
technologies, especially Internet technologies that promote a 
sense of a woman’s having her own place for writing, formulation 
of ideas, and expressions of creativity—the very things that 
Virginia Woolf was calling for through her own essays and 
fiction. 2  
Additionally, self- or un-labeled feminists in- and outside 
the academy are enacting the theoretical model of the TPEC by 
participating in technological textuality that shapes western 
culture in profound ways that can potentially free women of some 
                       
2 I must acknowledge my own positionality with regard to the material I 
present. Although I believe that I have presented well the complications of 
women’s agency, I must acknowledge that I argue as a person who is situated 
in conditions of relative power. I am a white woman who works in 
administration in a large university in the U.S. I make a decent wage, I own 
a home, and I have much power and agency because of those situations. I may 
have marginalized other women who are different from me; I may not understand 
that I haven’t escaped many binarial notions at all. I need to learn a whole 
lot more about the situations of women that are not like my own. I would like 
to better live the ideals that I espouse, because the very fact that I can 
write down my words for others to read is a form of power than many millions 
of women in the world do not presently have. I do not intentionally assume to 
know what all the challenges are for women of cultural backgrounds that are 
different from my own. I am careful to at least remain aware of the 
privileges I describe and carry within my writing, but I understand that at 





of the oppressions of patriarchy that hold them down. 
Ultimately, though Irigaray and Wittig may disagree that turning 
the world “right side up again” (Truth 232) should be the goal, 
I do know that “these women together ought to be able to” (Truth 
232). 
 
A Screen of One’s Own: The TPEC and Feminist Technological 
Textuality in the 21st Century 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I use the terms defined in 
Chapter One to help flesh out my primary argument that TPECs are 
enacting the call to write that Virginia Woolf put forward in 
the early 20th Century. Nearly 100 years later, her ideas 
resonate deeply with feminists. For women in general there is 
still much progress to be made in many areas, but most assuredly 
in the academy, as serious scholars of ourselves, we must 
investigate women’s issues thoroughly. In Chapters Two through 
Six, I use the screens I have identified in Virginia Woolf’s A 
Room of One’s Own to analyze the practices of current-day 
textual technologists who write using new media in new ways that 
promote a feminist agenda. Finally, in Chapter Seven, I make 




U.S. culture. The following synopses of Chapters Two through Six 
identify the primary focus of each chapter.  
In Chapter Two, I assert that technological textuality is 
the use of textual technologies to promote cultural change, 
shift ways of thinking, or transgress boundaries through writing 
or using images in progressive ways. An extension of this term 
is feminist technological textuality. In feminist technological 
textuality, the cultural changes, shifts in ways of thinking, 
and transgressions of boundaries are promoted by individuals and 
groups who use technology to educate, critically analyze norms, 
traditions, and the status quo, and spread awareness of cultural 
traditions and assumptions that oppress, marginalize, or are 
counter-productive to women. It follows, then, that TPECs are 
feminist textual technological activists, whether they aspire to 
be or not. And because of the media through which they write, 
which is a visual, fluid, fluctuating environment, their work 
becomes a force for positive cultural change. 
In Chapter Three, I assert that eighty-some years after 
Woolf wrote A Room of One’s Own (2005), it is still true that 
many women are not allowed and also do not often claim for 
themselves the time, space, and freedom of thought to be 
creative, even though womens’ ability and desire for creativity 




complicates this fact in the 21st Century is that, despite some 
progress in terms of autonomy and independence that women have 
realized, they continue to be marginalized through a patriarchal 
culture that denies them freedoms that are taken for granted by 
men. In other words, gender matters in writing. But gender is a 
nebulous term that is ill-defined in 21st Century digital 
culture, where gender-bending, gender-switching, gender-
identifying, trans-gendering, and other forms of gender 
negotiations are moving from the margins toward the center. This 
fact complicates but also enlivens the scholarly conversation 
about who gets to write, who has access, and who uses digital 
technologies for progressive purposes. The TPEC is at the 
forefront of this phenomenon. 
In Chapter Four, I look at the screen of aesthetics. 
Aesthetic ideals and preferences are inexorably linked to 
culture. In U.S. culture, aesthetics are indoctrinated through a 
patriarchal viewpoint that values male over female. Further, 
many technologies, especially since the industrial revolution, 
have been and continue to be gendered, and they are gendered 
because they developed in patriarchal social and economic 
systems. In particular, computer technology is inherently 
masculine. This fact can be demonstrated by surveying the 




examining the various approaches that feminist theories have 
taken toward computer technology, and finally, by situating 
Virginia Woolf’s work relative to this position and describing 
how women are using Internet technologies to create their own 
aesthetically pleasing environments and increase their personal 
and collective agency. 
 Further, I take up the notion of identity(ies) as texts and 
connect foundational feminist theories, theories of texts and 
technologies, Woolf, and TPECs. In my view, studying texts and 
their influence by, on, and within technologies, is one way that 
women can participate in refashioning how western culture 
perceives and appreciates identity, individuality, 
interconnectedness, relationships, and power. Ultimately, those 
also are the aspects of society that continue to perplex the 
TPEC and that continue to be addressed by feminist textual 
technological activists who host Web sites, use Facebook 
accounts, and write blogs. 
In Chapter Five, I approach the idea that in 21st Century 
digital culture, the TPEC is constantly mediated through a 
series of screens, or screenings. Woolf recognized this in her 
time, and some of her astute observations about misogyny and its 
relationship with economics apply still today. In one of her 




stated about the women’s conundrum, “I thought how unpleasant it 
is to be locked out; and I thought how it is worse perhaps to be 
locked in” (Woolf 2005 24). She movingly iterates how so many 
women, even to this day, feel about living within patriarchy, 
even those who don’t know intellectually against what they are 
struggling: fighting to gain foothold within the constructs of a 
society that doesn’t allow women to fully engage and 
participate, even when success is realized, is often bitter-
sweet and dissatisfying to women because, once “in,” they face 
alienation, envy, and jealousy from those who remain without as 
well as emptiness of meaning within themselves because the 
‘inside” remains aesthetically barren, intellectually 
unrewarding, and materially insufficient. The balance that 
ideally could exist between the man-womanly and the woman-manly 
remains skewed in favor of the manly. 
In Chapter Six, I explain epistemology as a feminist 
concept and elaborate the areas of conjuncture among the various 
disciplines and theories that grapple with how we know what we 
know. This last screen, epistemology, is very important, and I 
use this chapter to explain how cognitive theory, feminist 
theory, and theories of texts and technologies work together and 
can effect change in the way knowledge is constructed, 




astute observations about epistemology to demonstrate the 
connections I make between her work, the theoretical 
underpinnings, and the examples of contemporary TPECs who use 
digital technologies to advance the work and worth of women. 
Moreover, by understanding that the brain and the body have been 
shown scientifically to be intimately co-important, a feminist 
epistemology that values context and situation, that posits 
facts as social constructions, and that favors the particular 
over the universal, when it is paired with the concept of the 
embodied mind, has the potential to be adopted by western 
culture in general and enacted in technological environments 
that can empower women. 
Finally, Chapter Seven is a chapter of possibilities. In 
the decades since Woolf’s time, women have emerged through the 
aftermath of several wars, sexual revolutions, the “me” decade 
of the 80s, the return to “balance” in the 90s, and the current 
new millennial era, which is unfolding as I write. These screens 
translate into current cultural topics that can be used in 
technological environments such as Web pages, Facebook accounts, 
and blogs that garner attention from the media, academicians, 
and the general public. It is clear that Woolf embodied the 




if any outlets besides her writing in which she could express 
her multiple selves.  
Woolf clearly envisioned a TPEC future for politically 
engaged feminist textual technological activist women writers. 
The TPEC in the 21st Century combines Woolf’s politically 
embodied writer with Haraway’s cyborg and the capabilities of 
women who use Internet technologies. The TPEC honors Woolf’s 
assertion that “a book is not made of sentences laid end to end, 
but of sentences built, if an image helps, into arcades and 
domes” (Woolf 2005: 76). I show how her work may have influenced 
the creative post-postmodernized writing of the women who run 
Web sites, update Facebook accounts, and blog. In the end TPEC 
writing is “adapted to the body”(Woolf 2005: 77), tampers “with 
the expected sequence” (Woolf 2005: 80), and “catch[es] those 
unrecorded gestures, those unsaid or half-said words, moths on 
the ceiling, when women are alone, unlit by the capricious and 










CHAPTER 2: THE TPEC AS FEMINIST TEXTUAL TECHNOLOGICAL ACTIVIST 
AND THE SCREENING OF VIRGINIA WOOLF 
 
They are highly democratic.  
They believe that one word  
is as good as another . . .  
They hate being useful,  
they hate making money,  
they hate being lectured about in public.  
In short, they hate anything  
that stamps them with one meaning  
or confines them to one attitude.  
For that is their nature: to change. 
 
Virginia Woolf  
(BBC 1937)  
 
Feminist Technological Textuality 
 
 As mentioned in Chapter One, the theoretical basis of this 
dissertation is multidisciplinary and includes aspects of 
cognitive theory, feminist theory, and theories of texts and 
technologies. I use these theories to observe and analyze the 
changes in societal norms and expectations that have taken place 
in the recent past and that continue to pervade the present and 
inform and influence the future. Specifically, Internet 
technologies such as Web sites, Facebook accounts, and blogs are 
vehicles for feminist technological textuality in current times.  
Textual technologies are technological tools that transform 




resources into hybrids of the two. I primarily use the term to 
refer to the transformation of books, news, social commentary, 
and other media through computer technology and its applications 
such as Facebook, Web sites, and blogs. 
 Technological textuality is the use of textual technologies 
to promote cultural change, shift ways of thinking, or 
transgress boundaries through writing or using images in 
progressive ways. An extension of this term is feminist 
technological textuality. In feminist technological textuality, 
the cultural changes, shifts in ways of thinking, and 
transgressions of boundaries are promoted by individuals and 
groups who use technology. Through their use of technology, they 
educate others and critically analyze norms, traditions, and the 
status quo, and they spread awareness of cultural traditions and 
assumptions that oppress, marginalize, or are counter-productive 
to women. 
In current western culture, women can use, and are using, 
technological textuality that promotes personal, cultural, and 
scholarly feminist ideas. It often has been said in recent years 
that millennial generation women are rejecting older forms of 
feminism, and they are reluctant to claim the term feminism and 
describe themselves as feminist. Some claim the current era is 




opportunities that textual technologies afford, and their 
increasingly inherent or “seamless” presence in western culture, 
I argue that feminist technological textuality resists and 
transforms the controversial label of feminism. Through using 
textual technologies, women in some ways have embraced the 
ideals of feminism by simultaneously blurring some of the 
perceived boundaries between feminist and mainstream culture. 
Later, I will describe how Virginia Woolf’s writing can be 
understood as early feminist textuality. Her work, A Room of 
One’s Own (2005),and many of her other texts are easily compared 
to contemporary textual technological activist texts that 
criticize and demand similar things in 21st Century technological 
environments such as social networking sites, Web sites, and 
blogs. 
 
The TPEC As Feminist Textual Technological Activist 
 
In A Room of One’s Own (2005), Woolf fervently calls for a 
woman to have a room of her own and money that is not tied to 
her family or a man. But in addition to this, she also declares 
the need for silence for women. In other words, she believes 
that a woman who would write cannot achieve writing without 




of the home and other concerns. More recent research suggests, 
however, that the 21st century woman--especially the younger, 
coming-of-age woman (the age of the women that Woolf addressed 
in the original lecture she gave on the subject)--views silence 
in a very different way. Currently twenty-something aged women 
in the U.S. do not value isolation, time alone, or even quiet, 
according to a recent article in The Chronicle Review by William 
Deresiewicz (2009), who outlined the “romantic ideal of 
solitude” (B7) as “the arena of heroic self-discovery” (B8). He 
declares that modernism created the suburb, and with it, the 
“universal threat of loneliness” (B8) that seems to pervade U.S. 
culture even now, in the postmodern age. Though he, like Woolf, 
believes in the value of silence and quiet contemplation, he 
goes on to state that the invention of computers and Internet 
technology was a turn of events that is not without its positive 
qualities--such as its ability to allow “isolated people to 
communicate with one another and marginalized people to find one 
another” (B8). But Dereseiwicz also observes that “as the 
internet’s dimensionality has grown, it has quickly become too 
much of a good thing” (B8) in that “a constant stream of 
mediated contact, virtual, notional, or simulated, keeps us 
wired to the electronic hive” (B8). And I argue that the TPEC is 




of older vs. newer cultural expectations. And, the TPEC has 
learned to adapt the intrusive technologies to her own need, 
which is the need to establish a space and a place in which her 
thoughts, ideas, and creative products are her own and over 
which she has control. 
For the younger generation of women currently in their 
twenties, this constant interruption of technological devices 
has become “completely natural” (Deresiewicz B8), and they have 
“no desire for solitude, have never heard of it, can’t imagine 
why it would be worth having” (B8). This might or might not have 
been viewed as sad news to Virginia Woolf. Like me, she might 
have proclaimed that there is a difference between silence and 
being “unplugged.” And there are nuances that make solitude 
different from loneliness that might not resonate with the 
younger generation of women who have grown up with computers, 
cell phones, and all sorts of high-tech devices. But unless 
Woolf and I proclaim such things in 160-character Facebook 
updates, they may go unnoticed. Woolf might have agreed with 
Deresiewicz that the younger generation should understand that 
“solitude enables us to secure the integrity of the self as well 
as to explore it” (B9) and that longer periods of sustained 
reading are necessary because “no real excellence, personal or 




arise without solitude” (B9). But Virginia Woolf did not know 
about computers, and I speculate that, had she had access to 
them, she might have embraced the possibility of simultaneously 
keeping connected with culture, family, friends, news, and world 
events and fulfilling her personal desire for solitude and deep 
sustained thought and her natural tendency toward shyness. Her 
need for these things might have thrown her into depression and 
suicide in her day, but I argue that, had she access to Facebook 
or the Internet, for example, she might have, like so many 20-
somethings today, found a balance between the social aspects of 
the technologies and their isolative qualities that in some ways 
fulfill some women’s needs. After all, social networking is 
typically not done in groups. At its surface, it is a “plugged 
in” technology that seems to encourage constant contact, 
disclosure, and brevity of thought. But at its deeper levels, 
the act of being logged in to a social network, a Web site, a 
blog, or even texting on the cell phone, is a solitary act. One 
performs it alone, at one’s own speed, at one’s own will, and 
one comes and goes from it at her own choosing. Potentially, the 
act of using Internet and social networking technologies may 
engender the idleness of which Woolf spoke, the free association 




attention to the seemingly insignificant details that Freud 
espoused. 
Katherine Hayles (2008) and many others in recent years 
disagree with the notion that the twenty-something and younger 
generations are incapable of deep thought and prolonged 
consideration of complex subjects that Deresciewicz suggests. At 
a video-conferenced lecture that I attended at the University of 
Central Florida in 2008, Hayles stated that although the 
millennial generation learns differently and may have a shorter 
attention span, one of the ways to engage the younger generation 
is to meet them on their own turf, to consider how video games, 
for example, might be adapted to introduce classic literature or 
complicated theories. At the time of Hayles’ lecture, Facebook 
was not as pervasive as it is today, but I think she might have 
agreed that the introduction of classic literature and 
complicated theories is taking place in this forum, and there is 
some evidence that people are paying attention and engaging with 
it. For example, a quick search on Facebook for the term 
“Virginia Woolf” yields 247 Facebook accounts, 54 of which are 
obviously dedicated to the author. These 54 accounts garner a 
total of 884 “friends.” Aside from the biographical information 




content, themes, feminism, and other higher-level areas of 
thought.  
Unlike Deresiewicz, Hayles hasn’t (nor have I) lost hope 
that younger generations will continue in their own ways to 
contribute, argue with, and create new paradigms that allow 
formerly marginalized voices to be heard. But, if Web pages, 
Facebook accounts, and blogs in themselves are aspects of the 
21st century rooms of one’s own, of what historical importance 
could the texts that they produce become? Are the texts 
themselves important historically, or are the engagement, 
action, and pervasive cultural influence of these phenomena the 
most historically relevant and transformative? The TPEC sheds 
some light on these questions. 
Scholars have speculated about the possibility that the 
Internet might provide spaces in which marginalized communities 
can come together and individuals can seek refuge from bodily-
worldly customs or constrictions. Moreover, these technology-
based social, political, and interest-based communities are 
responsible for revolutionary changes in societal constructs and 
knowledge, such as those described in Canada by Francois Lyotard 
in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1984). 
Baudrillard (1975), too, argued more than two decades ago that 




on a screen, trump reality and “supercede reality in importance” 
(Hill 26), at least in postmodern western culture. Gregory Ulmer 
(1985, 1994) might agree because he uses similar analogies in 
his theoretical work about moving from literacy to electracy. 
And, Virginia Woolf’s screens help formulate the TPEC’s 
imag/e/ined room of one’s own, on/in/through which the TPEC 
performs activist texts that contribute to and influence in 
positive, feminist ways the culture in which they live. 
As mentioned earlier, the metaphorical frames that I use to 
extend arguments are characterized as screens. I use this method 
for several reasons, but primarily, the term screen resonates on 
a number of levels with the critical and progressive writing of 
Virginia Woolf. She clearly viewed the world through screens 
that were different from those that were used and expected of 
women in her dominant culture. I use the screen metaphor to 
connect her classic work to current feminist technological 
textuality on Web pages, Facebook accounts, and blogs. 
 Using the screen approach works well for paying respect to 
Virginia Woolf’s writing and progressive ideals. Susan Gubar 
pointed out in her introduction to the annotated edition of A 
Room of One’s Own (2005), for example, that Woolf employs a 
number of feminist “diatribes” (lii). One of the first of these 




acquisition’ driving those in its thrall ‘to desire other 
people’s fields and goods perpetually; to make frontiers and 
flags; battleships and poison gas; to offer up their own lives 
and their children’s lives’” (lii). In other words, Woolf often 
chose to diatribe against the patriarchal cultural ideal of war, 
which is a rather common trope in feminist criticism. I also 
agree with Gubar that Woolf is particularly insistent in A Room 
of One’s Own (2005) that what the west embraces as capitalism 
is, at its core, detrimental to the situation of women. Woolf 
recognized that capitalistic practices are born out of 
patriarchy and perpetuate war, violence, border-building, and 
death because capitalism pursues acquisition above all else. 
Woolf was adamantly opposed to these behaviors and ideals. By 
processing her socio-political critique through the screen that 
I label “misogyny and the economics of enough,” Woolf discerned 
what would be necessary for women if they were to be able to 
participate fully in life, education, politics, writing, 
literature, and more.  
Woolf’s feminist admonitions still ring true, and I add to 
them by linking Woolf’s experimental writing style with 
contemporary technology-influenced experimental, activist 




accounts such as jezebel.com, current.com, mom-101, and Minal 
Hajratwala. 
 Woolf published A Room of One’s Own in 1929, the year after 
women in England won the right to vote. It is important to note 
that I wrote the preceding sentence in the active voice—because 
Virginia Woolf did literally publish her own works at Hogarth 
Press, which she established with her husband in 1917. Although 
she had been widely published in England and in the U.S. prior 
to beginning her own publishing operation, after 1921 she 
published all of her work in England at Hogarth Press. I mention 
these facts because later, they become important to my project 
of drawing parallels between Woolf’s life and work and women 
currently working or establishing themselves as authors by self-
publishing in digital contexts, an activity, I wager, of which 
Woolf certainly would have approved.  
Further, in A Room of One’s Own (2005), Woolf establishes 
one primary argument and several secondary arguments. Her main 
idea is that women should write by whatever means they have, 
through whatever avenues are available to them, for whomever 
will read it, and even if nobody reads it. The imperative is 
that women write: “Therefore I would ask you to write all kinds 
of books, hesitating at no subject however trivial or however 




yourselves of money enough to travel and to idle, to contemplate 
the future or the past of the world, to dream over books and 
loiter at street corners and let the line of thought dip deep 
into the stream”(107). In my view, Woolf would have enjoyed the 
grass-roots style of writing and participating that the Internet 
allows in its free blog spots, email accounts, social networks, 
and Web site access. Indeed, the blogger who writes mom-101 (see 
Figure 1), who is known only as “Liz,” commented on a similar 
phenomenon that happens on her blog and the comments that are 
shared on it.  
 
Figure 1: Mom-101 blog logo 
 
Mom-101 writes in her entry from July 21, 2008, “There's 
this funny thing I've discovered about comments on blog posts. 
You can spend hours crafting a long, heartfelt essay about 
falling in love with your baby, close with some offhanded line 




commenters will weigh in about lime popsicles.” Mom-101 is being 
facetious, but her thought echoes Woolf’s in that she points out 
that sometimes what we think is important turns out not to be, 
and sometimes what we think is unimportant turns out to be the 
idea that sparks interest in a continued conversation. And like 
Woolf, mom-101 decides by the end of this post that this 
meandering of her mind and the minds of her readers is 
acceptable, and writing for writing’s sake is an incredible 
achievement in its own right. She writes,  
We don't have to be ashamed about what we do or why we do 
it. Whether we blog for money or friendship or approval or 
attention or magical beans. I said it in the first 
Momosphere panel and I meant it: It's all good . . . 
Sometimes writing for an audience leads you to a ballroom 
stage in front of 1000 other writers so you can finally 
start to banish the voices in your head that tell you 
you're not good enough. But that's not the only place it 
leads. Maybe your writing leads to you a party where you 
meet someone who may end up becoming a dear friend for the 
rest of your life. Maybe it leads you to shake hands with a 
celebrity.  Or maybe this kind of writing leads you to 
contribute to a book . . . Thank you to you for being the 
place that my writing leads. Because you were there. Or 
because you are here . . . It's freaking hot in New York 
today. I could go for a lime popsicle (July 21, 2008). 
 
Further, even at face-to-face conferences of participants 
in the “blogosphere,” participants are embracing the gender-
neutral ideals of some feminist digital practices. As evidenced 
by the photo in Figure 2, which shows the registration table at 





Figure 2: BlogHer 08 Conference registration table 
 
Indeed, Woolf wrote that one of the most remarkable moments 
in history occurred outside any professorial textbook or 
governmental accounting of wars: “towards the end of the 
eighteenth century a change came about which, if I were 
rewriting history, I should describe more fully and think of 
greater importance than the Crusades or the War of the Roses. 
The middle-class woman began to write” (Woolf 2005 64). Indeed, 
using 21st Century technologies, the TPEC is the new middle-class 
woman, and her Web sites, Facebook updates, and blogs are her 
new way of writing. And even though Woolf acknowledges a number 
of serious obstacles to women writing, which include lack of 
isolation for sustained thought, dedicated space, money, and 




habit of freedom and the courage to write exactly what we think 
. . . that (emphasis mine). . . even in poverty and obscurity, 
is worthwhile” (112). 
 
The Image-Writing of the TPEC 
 
Woolf’s writing embodies the woman-manliness and the man-
womanliness that she advocates in A Room of One’s Own (2005). In 
it, Woolf describes the way that she approached her own writing 
when she had been asked to give the lecture at a women’s college 
in England, the text of which would eventually become the book A 
Room of One’s Own (2005). Because the method seemed counter-
productive at the time she experienced it, the route she took to 
discovering what she really wanted to say would foreshadow the 
methods of later scholars who put forward theories for 
engendering writing, such as Barthes in A Lover’s Discourse 
(1978), Derrida (1978, 1982), and Ulmer’s (1994) Heuretics and 
Mystory. In her final remarks, she laid out how she researched 
the topic that she was asked to speak on--women and fiction. She 
described how paralyzing it was for her to sit in the library 
for hours with “a blank sheet of paper on which was written in 
large letters WOMEN AND FICTION, but no more” (Woolf 2005 25). 




(family members and Bloomsbury associates) to write in a very 
linear way, beginning with a topic, forming an outline, 
sketching basic ideas, and so on, she assumed that doing so was 
the only appropriate tactic. But Woolf’s bitterness about her 
father’s denial to her of a formal education may have spurred 
her to embrace the method that she employed and ultimately 
recommended to the audience of her lecture. In other words, the 
actual process that she undertook for accomplishing her writing 
of that lecture was much less linear and directive than she had 
been taught to expect. She was shocked at the time, too, when 
she arrived at the messages of A Room of One’s Own (2005) in 
very circular and roundabout ways that were not at all familiar 
and that certainly were not intellectual or academic as the 
terms were understood in her time. Rather, her process for 
writing the lecture was prompted by a series of seemingly 
inconsequential events that happened to her while she prepared, 
such as a direct encounter with patriarchal systems in place in 
the university environment when she was forced by a beadle, or 
supervisor, to vacate the men’s university grounds onto which 
she had strayed. And in another instance, when she contrasted 
her experiences of having participated in a dinner amongst the 
university men at which they enjoyed lavish courses, much wine, 




which they had stale meat and bread pudding with only water to 
drink. Earlier, she wrote that “while I pondered I had 
unconsciously, in my listlessness, in my desperation, been 
drawing a picture where I should, like my neighbor, have been 
writing a conclusion” (Woolf 2005 31). Even in her daydreaming, 
she was a performative, embodied writer, and her actions offered 
a premonition of Ulmer’s later recommendations for discovery 
through image-writing and the aforementioned research by Lyotard 
and Baudrillard on images. 
 Woolf allowed these experiences—the feelings, the images, 
the dialogues, as well as the more traditional textual research, 
to enter her writing and to influence her observations about the 
world, and she exhorted the women students to whom she lectured 
to continue their learning, earn their own money, and establish 
for themselves their own private spaces within their homes so 
that they might continue to produce valuable textual works for 
themselves. Woolf’s writing, as well as her methods for 
engendering it, are excellent examples of feminist textual 
activist writing that infuse the personal and the political and 
that, through apparent haphazardness and fluidity, led to 
prophetic insight. She knew that drawing a picture was not 
supposed to lead her into composing a thoughtful and provocative 




result was a phenomenal feminist classic piece of literature 
that later solidified her reputation as a serious author and 
scholar. 
 Woolf’s techniques might be considered early methods of 
mystory, a concept that was introduced by Gregory Ulmer, who has 
done an immense amount of scholarly work developing his concepts 
of ‘mystory’ and ‘electracy’. Ulmer (Invent-L Conference 2007) 
stated “the grammatological interest in imaging place is the 
possibility (by analogy with the invention of conceptual 
categories, topics and the like) of inventing a practice of 
electrate reasoning.” In my view, Woolf was an early imager of 
place who understood, before the phenomena of the Internet and 
the World Wide Web, that a sense of place, whether imaged, as 
Ulmer refers to it, or imagined, as Appadurai (1996) might say, 
is important to writing in new, creative, and, I argue, activist 
ways. The TPEC as a feminist textual technological activist 
engages these imaged/imagined spaces to perform her writing and 
reach newer and wider audiences with progressive ideas. 
 Further, Ulmer’s (1994) description of mystory includes a 
similar approach, and, specifically, he states that mystory is:  
designed to simulate the experience of invention, the 
crossing of discourses that has been shown to occur in the 
invention process. Realizing that learning is much closer 
to invention than to verification, I intended 




academic writing now taught in school tend to be positioned 
on the side of the already known rather than on the side of 
wanting to find out (of theoretical curiosity) and hence 
discourage learning how to learn (xxi). 
 
Ulmer echoes Woolf’s admonition to move away from established 
formulas and academic, institutional methods for creating texts 
and write “as women write, not as men write” and to ignore “the 
perpetual admonitions of the eternal pedagogue” (Woolf 2005 74). 
 
The TPEC in Performance 
 
 So, what does TPEC writing look like? How does one know 
when she is reading a TPEC text? There are many adjectives that 
describe TPEC writing: reflective, political, personal, 
confrontational/challenging, inviting, commentary and 
discussion-inducing, non-formulaic, feminist, re-mapping, 
embodied, contributory, social and solitary, negotiative. To put 
these descriptors into any type of hierarchical scheme would be 
disingenuous and anathema to a TPEC writer; at times the TPEC is 
more one than the other, less negotiative and more 
confrontational, more personal and less political, etc. But a 
TPEC’s writing necessarily includes feminist insight and 




patriarchal assumptions about its topic whether the topic be 
culture, literature, information, or any other. 
In the performative writing that is featured below, I 
construct a story whose characters are the TPECs, who are used 
as examples in this dissertation, and me (whose examples are 
taken from my Facebook page). This conversation did not take 
place in real time, and these “characters,” I believe, do not 
know or even know of one another in reality other than that some 
of them are now my “friends” on Facebook. But as a TPEC writing 
exercise, I construct this conversation as a demonstration not 
only of TPEC writing, but also to show how TPECs from across the 
globe from quite different cultural environments recognize 
themselves in each other because they perform their feminism in 
similar, familiar textual ways. Although their conversation 
below did not actually happen, their statements, feedback, and 
responses mesh together as if it did. This exercise shows in a 
creative way how TPECs can know and recognize each other, even 
when they come from disparate backgrounds, locations, time 
periods, and circumstances.  
 This story is not traditionally crafted. The statements 
that each TPEC makes are lifted directly from her Facebook page, 
her blog, her Web site, or another form of her writing. Some of 




by other TPECs who contribute to her digital space. But make no 
mistake: that they come together as a conversational story is no 
accident. TPECs embody textual technological feminism, and these 
qualities are especially present in their words. Whether they 
come from the Mexico-U.S. borderlands, L.A., the Mid-west, or 
anywhere else, their words are recognizable to each other and 
their thoughts and ideas complement each other as a conversation 
that reveals their ideals, politics, and important contributions 




Liz:  The writer of a mommy blog, mother of two, married in  
  a heterosexual relationship 
Shannon: The homosexually married lesbian moderator of a   
  Facebook  page about feminism in the 21st Century 
Minal: American of Indian descent, writer, lesbian, believer  
  in unicorns 
Amy:  The moderator. Single feminist mother of two girls,  
  divorced, doctoral candidate desperate to produce a  
  compelling feminist dissertation that means something  




Carmen: Mexican Maquiladora worker, single mother of three,  
  living in a ramshackle home with a dirt floor just  
  south of the U.S.-Mexico boarder 
Sarah: 30-something single woman with a budding career in TV  
  journalism and comedy writing 
Jezebel: Multiply-dimensioned and personalitied writer for a  
  pop culture Web site with a feminist twist 
Virginia: A prolific, childless, androgynous, manic, brilliant  




Amy:  What exactly is a TPEC? 
Sarah: Mostly, we just look like women. 
Jezebel: We need to target the mother. Call it sexist, but  
  that’s the way nature made it.  
Amy:  She is the very epitome of understatement, but at the  
  same time she is the strongest, most generous,   
  compassionate person. Give thanks for great moms! 
Sarah: Because she’s a woman. Stick yourself in the middle of 





Amy:  If she’s nothing else, she’s brave. But what does a  
  TPEC woman do? 
Carmen: Every day, we clear new paths. 
Sarah: Tell me more about this foolproof system. 
Amy:  Sometimes you just got to take the trash out,   
  girlfriend. Put it out at the curb and don’t wait til  
  Friday. 
Carmen: We make changes in our daily lives, in our    
  communities, in our workplaces, and within ourselves. 
Virginia: do what will be for your good and for the good of the  
  world at large. 
 
Amy:  How does she fare economically and physically for  
  doing all of this? 
Carmen: When I started working there, my nose used to bleed. 
Amy:  Unbelievable. 
Shannon: The raw wage gap continues to be used in misleading  
  ways to advance public policy agendas without fully  
  explaining the reasons behind the gap. 
Jezebel: Misogyny is sucking the life force today. 
Liz:  Sadly, I’m used to it. 
Carmen: When I started to work there, I liked the environment. 




Shannon: The seemingly unbridgeable chasm between the size of  
  the paycheck brought home by the woman and the larger  
  one earned by a man doing the same job. 
Sarah: Here, have $.75 of my dollar. 
Liz:  I can be better, we can all be better. At giving   
  credit and acknowledging inspiration and simply   
  supporting one another. 
 
Amy:  What is important to TPECs politically? 
Sarah: This year, nothing is hotter than politics. 
Liz:  So today, [election day] I want to go out on a limb  
  (with encouragement by Julie and Jon Stewart) to take  
  on the crazy. Because the only crazy I like in this  
  country is on Bravo every night around 9pm and   
  involves Botox. 
Sarah:  If they want to know what’s important to us, they  
  should just watch our favorite show! 
Shannon: Well, that’s good! And thankfully none of them are  
  Republicans. 
Amy:  I have no idea whether this Krystal Ball is fit for  
  congressional service, but her response to her   
  republican detractors is spot on. I say keep on   




Jezebel: Repubs are so dead set on all of us wimmenz having  
  babies whether we want to or not. Denying us the most  
  basic rights over our own bodies, and yet, if you  
  happen to be a woman of the wrong skin color, you’re  
  using your womb to invade our country. 
Shannon: We have been sleepwalking into an authoritarian police 
  state and our civil liberties continue to be taken  
  from us without restraint or justification. We must  
  protect our rights! 
Liz:  Now these initiatives may not line up with your   
  values, and in that case, I will try to respect that,  
  but they certainly line up with mine. 
Shannon: Sign this petition in case it helps. 
 
Amy:  Is the TPEC angry? 
Sarah: Particularly women are angry. 
Virginia: Anger had snatched my pencil while I dreamt. But what  
  was anger doing there? 
Sarah: They ask some serious questions. 
Amy:  In honor of . . . all the other women who explode at  
  inopportune times and cause a mess. 
Sarah: It’s not arguing, it’s just looking for consensus  




Virginia: All I retrieved for that morning’s work had been the  
  one fact of anger. 
Sarah: I am a woman, so I must be angry. 
 
Amy:  So how does a TPEC go about writing? 
Carmen: We see things differently. 
Sarah: You may need to adopt an approach based on a metaphor  
  or simile. 
Virginia: The artist as ‘lightening conductor’ has the capacity  
  to feel the shock of electricity and convey it without 
  being consumed by it. 
Shannon: There surely is no higher form of humor, indeed no  
  more fulfilling calling, than being deliberately   
  offensive. 
Sarah: some women do need a more empirical approach. 
Liz:  We generate ideas and put together words in ways that  
  engage our audience and connect us with our    
  communities. It’s profoundly personal, whether you’re  
  writing about apple tarts or your baby’s first steps. 
Minal: I was thinking about scuba diving, about water as my 
element (I’m a Cancer) and about my name which means 
fish . . . I woke up . . . by my dreams, which were 




was a beautiful sunny day. . . I felt this was an 
excellent beginning . . . so I went down the hill to 
the bakery, ate a grilled fennel focaccia, had an 
affogato across the street at the gelato place, and 
drove to the beach. I boogie boarded and swam in the 
ocean for a couple of hours, then laid on the beach 
for awhile. Now I’m off to dinner with a friend . . . 
I did them with joy. 
Virginia: It poured itself out, higgledy-piggledy, in    
  torrents of rhyme and prose, poetry and philosophy  
  which stand congealed in quartos and folios that   
  nobody ever reads. 
Amy:  Maya Angelou once said, “People all over the world use 
  words: the writer comes along and has to use these  
  most-in-use objects, put together a few nouns,   
  pronouns, verbs, adjectives . . . and pull them   
  together and make them bounce, throw them against the  
  wall and make people say, ‘I never thought of it that  
  way.’” 
Minal: How beautiful to hear the cadences and languages, to  
  watch the faces and take in the voices that—finally— 




Virginia: When a woman speaks to women she should have something 
  very unpleasant up her sleeve . . . let us agree,  
  then, that a paper read by a woman to women should end 
  with something particularly disagreeable. 
Liz:  My references to writer’s rape has struck quite the  
  negative chord with survivors of sexual violence, and  
  I can’t say I blame them. It was strong, provocative  
  language, and I employed it based on my understanding  
  of the traditional definition and other uses of the  
  word. My intent here is never to hurt anyone, and  
  certainly not to marginalize the survivors of real  
  physical and emotional harm in any way. 
Sarah: Yeah, I think, duh, too. 
Minal: I want to be present for whatever’s going on in life,  
  too. So if I end up not being able to write as much as 
  all that, I figure I’ll at least have several thousand 
  words through the effort, which is more than I’d   
  probably produce otherwise. Hooray for productive  
  failure! 
Virginia: There must be no obstacle in it, no foreign matter  
  unconsumed. 
Liz:  Because that says, this person has smart ideas. This  




Minal: I’ve been noticing this lack of language myself. What  
  language there is sounds rather mundane, and doesn’t  
  in any case communicate the actual experience to   
  someone who hasn’t had it. 
Liz:  Our ideas and our words: They’re all we got. That’s  
  it. Ideas and words. 
 
Amy:  Final thoughts? 
Sarah: I learned a lesson from that. 
Amy:  Some happenings are very difficult to believe. 
Virginia: Ought not education to bring out and fortify the   
  differences rather than the similarities? 
Shannon: Hooray! I’m finally useful despite my lack of a penis! 
Sarah: I cannot wait for this all to be over. 
Carmen: We have learned about our rights as women and as   
  workers. 
Jezebel: Now, I realize, I *have* to be here. I have to be the  
  one to speak up, to notice the injustice, and to yell  
  out for everyone that is treated as less than human. 
Shannon: Feminism isn’t merely important to the 21st Century, if 
  there is to be any progress, feminism IS the 21st   
  Century. 





Through their various feminist textual acts, TPECs are 
involved in an ongoing conversation that flows, interacts, 
reacts, and pushes boundaries that may formerly have kept them 
from realizing the power of their words, their deeds, and their 
progressive ideals. In Chapters Three through Seven, the TPECs 
in the conversation above are featured in examples of Woolf’s 
cultural screens at work in digital feminist textual 
environments. They illustrate the value of observing and 
critiquing culture through a feminist technological lens, and in 
doing so, they add to the repository of historical texts that 







CHAPTER 3: SCREENING SEX, SEXUALITY, AND GENDER 
 
Have you any notion of how many books are written 
about women in the course of one year? Have you any  
notion how many are written by men? Are you  
aware that you are, perhaps, the most discussed  
animal in the universe? 
 
-Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (2005) 
 
When Woolf wrote about the need for a room of one’s own, 
she wrote a truism that inspired generations of feminist textual 
activists. In 2010, eighty-some years after she wrote A Room of 
One’s Own, it is still true that many women are not allowed and 
also do not often claim for themselves the time, space, and 
freedom of thought to be creative, even though women’s ability 
and desire for creativity are arguably more recognized and 
accepted today. But what complicates this fact in the 21st 
Century is that, despite some progress in terms of autonomy and 
independence that women have realized, they continue to be 
marginalized through a patriarchal culture that denies them 
freedoms that are taken for granted by men. Women still perform 
the majority of childrearing, household chores, and cooking 
duties, and, whether they are married or not, often are expected 
to work and provide income for the family. Women who choose to 




arrangements, and societal norms are denied opportunities in 
other ways because of their identification as single, single 
mother, homosexual, or childless (among others), all terms that 
marginalize many women as Other (Other meaning a group of others 
with similar qualities) and lacking. Monique Wittig (1992) sums 
up the phenomenon of the “Other” when she states, “What has 
happened in history throughout the revolutions which we have 
known is that the Other (a category of others) has substituted 
itself for the One, keeping under it huge groups of oppressed 
peoples that would in turn become the Other of the ex-others, 
become by then the One” (53). Scholars such as Grosz 1994; 
Haraway 1991; Hayles 2001; and Miller 2001 have observed this 
phenomenon of “othering.” They recognize the influence of 
technologies on everyday households in western culture, and they 
realize that women continue to risk being “othered” through 
technologies, including Internet technologies. But the TPEC’s 
use of Woolfian and other critical screens to examine culture 
are creating a new reality in which they resist oppression and 






Woolf and Women as a Sex 
 
Susan Gubar asks in her introduction to A Room of One’s Own 
(2005), “How does this . . . affirmation of art inform Virginia 
Woolf’s approach to sexuality and to the much discussed ideal of 
androgyny” (lvi)? Gubar elucidates Woolf’s attention to 
sexuality and gender issues and points to one of Woolf’s primary 
arguments in so many of her texts: in patriarchy, women, as a 
sex3 are nearly always defined by what they are NOT or what they 
lack in relationship to men. Further, women are an astoundingly 
often-treated subject in the works of men. Woolf continuously 
calls out the mistakes made by centuries of men who have defined 
the sex “women” incorrectly and, quite frankly, badly! For 
example, Woolf asks, “Have you any notion of how many books are 
written about women in the course of one year? Have you any 
notion how many are written by men? Are you aware that you are, 
perhaps, the most discussed animal in the universe” (Woolf 2005 
26)? Moreover, Woolf assertively recognizes that “men . . .  
have no apparent qualification save that they are not women . . 
                       
3 I use the term sex because that is the term most often used by Woolf—today, 
I would opt for the term gender, but cultural influences have irrevocably 
changed the way westerners interpret these words, so I want to try to at 





.” and that “many [books that were written about women] . . . 
were serious and prophetic, moral and hortatory” (27).  
 But, it is when she remarks, “Why are women . . . so much 
more interesting to men than men are to women?” (27) that she 
uncovers a key difference among the sexes in how they approach 
interactions with each other. She further writes, “Men were no 
longer to her ‘the opposing faction’; she need not waste her 
time railing against them; she need not climb on to the roof and 
ruin her peace of mind longing for travel, experience and a 
knowledge of the world and character that were denied her” (91). 
In other words, when women began to take up the pen, they wrote 
about the more important and interesting subjects to them, were 
decidedly not patronizing to men, and were disinterested in 
wasting the valuable, short periods of time they had for writing 
with speculations about the opposite sex. Woolf realized that 
women who write understand that the exercise of writing 
explanations of the opposite sex is futile and a waste of 
everyone’s time; she wrote, “Here I drew a breath and added, 
indeed, in the margin, Why does Samuel Butler say, ‘Wise men 
never say what they think of women?’ Wise men never say anything 
else apparently . . . what is so unfortunate is that wise men 




 An example of how this phenomenon remains evident in the 
current context of the Internet is provided on the Web site 
Jezebel.com. This Web site states that it is “celebrity, sex, 
fashion for women: without airbrushing” (Jezebel 2010). In a 
post by Hortense Smith, Jezebel revealed that the magazine Men’s 
Health recently included a feature article, ostensibly written 
by a woman of authority, about “25 Secrets She Wishes You Knew.” 
Among the “secrets” were gems such as “Manicures and pedicures 
are a woman's gift to her man. I love looking pretty for you. 
The time to worry is when I stop going for them.” I could engage 
Woolf’s arguments with this type of writing about women on many 
levels, including its assumptions of heteronormativity, that 
women do nothing for themselves except when it comes to an end 
that pleases a man, that women who do not get manis and pedis 
are assumed to be not heterosexual and therefore undesirable 
even amongst themselves. I could go on. But while Jezebel uses 
this post as a forum for discussion on the misguided topics 
featured in men’s magazines, in doing so, it also reveals the 
significance of the difference between the content of media 
outlets such as Men’s Health and its own. In reviewing 
approximately two hundred posts under the section on “sex” on 
Jezebel.com, the posts that were about men or relationships with 




outlets for their inherent misogyny and lack of insight into 
women. In the “sex” section of Jezebel.com, at least, women 
write far more often about what interests women, and most of the 
time, that interest does not involve trying to elucidate 
explanations of the male human as a species. 
 From the viewpoint that discussing men and women as 
separate, distinct, and profoundly different sexes is an 
exercise in futility, Woolf explicitly unravels her 
groundbreaking ideas about sexuality in A Room of One’s Own 
(2005), but she takes the ideas further, in more stylistic ways, 
in the semi-autobiographical, semi-fictional, somewhat magically 
realistic Orlando. In my view, the treatment of sexuality in A 
Room of One’s Own (2005) is a sort of explanation for what, in 
retrospect, she had accomplished in writing Orlando, which had 
been published the year prior. For example, Woolf wrote, 
“perhaps, to think, as I had been thinking these two days, of 
one sex as distinct from the other is an effort. It interferes 
with the unity of the mind” (Woolf 2005 95). Yet again, the 
transgression that is enacted by Woolf’s sex, sexuality, and 
gender screen illustrates the profundity of her realization that 
there may indeed be no essential, organic, biological 
distinction between the sexes, save, perhaps, for actual sexual 




 Gubar notes Woolf’s contemplation of the differences 
between the sexes. Woolf pondered, “Different though the sexes 
are, they intermix” (Gubar 2005 189). And Gubar further observes 
that, “particularly toward the conclusion of A Room of One’s Own 
(2005), this idea results in a meditation on androgyny, though 
throughout Woolf could be said to be grappling with issues of 
sexuality” with “some interpreting it as a renunciation of 
sexuality altogether” (Woolf 2005 lvii). And I agree with Gubar 
that “A Room of One’s Own (2005) is an effort to transcend the 
partiality and competition of binary terms (like male and 
female) so as to arrive at “liberating moments of resonant being 
available to men as well as women” (Woolf 2005 lviii). Woolf 
continues to screen culture through the lens of sex, sexuality, 
and gender by rejecting the rigidity of binary behavior, delving 
even into the area of race relationships.  
The argument over the decades that European and U.S. 
feminism has historically been racist and exclusionary to women 
of color is not a new one. And what can even be seen here in 
Woolf’s writing is that she acknowledges the difficulty of 
living in a culture that devalues certain races of color, and 
she equates those ways of thinking with the devaluation of women 
that she so keenly experiences herself and observes in other 




other women (she often wrote of her concern for the poor) within 
patriarchal culture, she illustrates yet another shift between 
the inherent domination-submission paradigm of patriarchy and 
the more egalitarian feminist approach to societal matters. For 
example, Woolf writes, “it is one of the great advantages of 
being a woman that one can pass even a very fine negress without 
wishing to make an Englishwoman of her” (Woolf 2005 50). In 
other words, in Woolf’s view, there is nothing wrong with or 
less-than in a woman of color who may have different mannerisms, 
features, comportment, or cultural ideals. But the effects 
produced by so many years of patriarchal English colonialism 
throughout the world that have affected and established norms in 
contemporary English society have produced the superior 
attitudes that prevail as she writes, and many of which persist 
today in U.S. culture. 
 The Web site Jezebel.com confronts majority societal 
criticism and rejection of homosexuality and androgyny on a 
regular basis. For example, since 2008, the Web site posted 
nineteen items that dealt directly with androgyny, some of which 
are posted below. Included in those postings was one particular 
item of note that focuses on the androgyny of the actor who 
played Orlando in the film adaptation of Woolf’s Orlando. The 




work of screening sex, sexuality, and gender societal constructs 
and transgressing lines of assumption based on them to move 


































Further, Woolf adopts a much more liberal view of what some 
may term alternative lifestyles, even among Englishmen and 
women, and she asserts in many ways throughout A Room of One’s 
Own (2005) and her other work that homosexuality and androgyny 
are not abhorrent or wrong, but completely natural, acceptable, 
and inevitable. She first observes this relationship among women 
in A Room of One’s Own (2005) when she cites what many readers, 
including the young women to whom she was lecturing, may have 
passed over completely in the work of author Mary Carmichael. 
Woolf keenly observes in Carmichael’s work a change in the tenor 
and tone of meaning in Carmichael’s brief sentence “Chloe liked 
Olivia.” Woolf writes, ”I may tell you that the very next words 
I read were these—‘Chloe liked Olivia . . .’ Do not start. Do 
not blush. Let us admit in the privacy of our own society that 
these things sometimes happen. Sometimes women do like women” 
(81). And Woolf continues, “’Chloe liked Olivia,’ I read. And 
then it struck me how immense a change was there. Chloe liked 
Olivia perhaps for the first time in literature” (81). With this 
passage, Woolf begins to directly address the importance of 
writing for women—writing for writing’s sake, yes, but also 
writing for the promotion of feminist ideals. Her assertion that 
such a simple phrase in a literary work can carry such weight 




writing to be for women. The example she uses, “Chloe liked 
Olivia,” also demonstrates how very impactful and meaningful 
only a few choice words can be, a concept which resonates deeply 
with me as I draw meaning from Woolf’s way of screening sex, 
sexuality, and gender to analyze the power of current-era 
digitally-produced, often abbreviated, activist technological 
texts. 
 I respect Woolf’s attention to the mood of a phrase, the 
tone of an idea, and the absolute importance of a relatively 
simple statement, and I speculate that some Facebook status 
updates engender a similar impact. For example, in a discussion 
post on the Facebook account “Feminism is important to the 21st 
Century, fifteen-year-old JillAnn Meunier wrote, “I'm 15, but if 
I had known the word feminist when I was a toddler, I would have 
been one then, too.” And in another discussion thread on the 
same account, Chris O’Leary wrote, “why don’t we all just call 
ourselves equalists?” On some level, these posts touch on some 
very important feminist issues such as how to get around the 
negative “f-word” syndrome associated with the word feminism 
that leads the mainstream public to think of feminists as man-
haters. For example, in U.S. culture, most people assume that 
toddlers are pure and that they have not yet been too deeply 




expectations of their environment. Yet this young woman seems to 
indicate rather profoundly that she could think for herself and 
perform her identity, despite a limited vocabulary, at a very 
young age. And therefore, if one agrees that toddlers are 
relatively pure in mind and heart, this young woman knew at the 
age of three or younger that she was a feminist and that she 
knew that she was equal to any other toddler. It’s a very 
simple, but quite provocative statement that raises all sorts of 
questions. When do children begin to know the cultural 
expectations of being a girl or a boy? How do they know them? 
Who teaches them and how do they learn or not learn to rely on 
their own thoughts and ideas to establish their world view? Is 
it possible to NOT learn cultural norms or to reject them at 
such an early age? These questions are complicated by the 
evolution of “post feminism,” which is a culture-based opinion 
held by many women who are currently in their twenties. Woolf 
herself was troubled by the emergence of the word “feminism,” 
which came into common use during her lifetime. She actually 
denied that she was a feminist, preferring at some moments to be 
called a “Sapphist” and at others to refute her identity as 
either, though she continued to live, write, and love in very 
feminist ways. Perhaps it is not the term itself that is 




patriarchal cultural negativity associated with it. The TPEC 
also resists labels by  being simultaneously human and machine, 
flesh and ether, technology-enabled and technology-restricted. 
Therefore, TPECs may be able to transcend boundaries self-
imposed or imposed upon them by a culture that changes more 
slowly than they. 
 Woolf’s work and these Web sites, blogs, and Facebook 
accounts offer commentary and suggestions that address some of 
these questions and illuminate some of the ways women in 21st 
Century digital environments are applying feminist principles to 
the subject matter of their writing. 
 
Gender and Writing 
 
 In her work, Woolf identifies some key characteristics of 
feminist writing that prevail to this day and that can guide the 
TPEC and other feminist textual activists in the 21st century who 
use different devices and mechanisms for feminist technological 
textuality but who nonetheless observe and manipulate texts in 
various forms to promote the valuable ideals of feminism. For 
Woolf, a feminist writer is someone who uses “both sides of his 
mind equally” (Woolf 2005 102). And she even refers to the fact 




men and women and by many cultures, employed this approach to 
writing. She remarked, for example, “the obvious reason would be 
that it is natural for the sexes to cooperate” (Woolf 2005 96) 
in two ways: first, in the sense that the male and female 
aspects of a writer can manifest to produce extremely powerful 
and influential literature, and second, in the sense that men 
and women should influence each other’s writing for the benefit 
of the writing, and if they do so, the writing that results will 
be more compelling and meaningful. But Woolf pushes this 
assertion even deeper by citing Shakespeare’s work. She states 
that “one must turn back to Shakespeare, then, for Shakespeare 
was androgynous” (Woolf 2005 102) and that “it is fatal for 
anyone who writes to think of their sex. It is fatal to be a man 
or woman pure and simple. One must be woman-manly or man-
womanly” (103).  
 Finally, it is this woman-manly or man-womanly approach to 
writing that I am so grateful to Woolf for observing and to 
today’s feminist textual activists for using to promote feminist 
ideals and influence cultural change. 
 The second example above by Chris O’Leary also 
intentionally or unintentionally disrupts culturally-ingrained 
thought paradigms by changing the vocabulary of feminism and 




feminists may argue that there is nothing wrong with the term 
feminist and those who disagree with or are uncomfortable with 
the word should just get over it, stop apologizing for it, or 
stop looking for an escape from it to appease newer generations 
of women or “post-feminists.” But what is disruptive about the 
suggestion of using the term “equalist” is not just the word 
itself. Part of the disruption occurs because the person who 
posted the suggestion could be a man or a woman—the name is 
Chris O’Leary. Chris has a non-gender specific photo on her or 
his Facebook account and has concealed his or her gender. As an 
audience to this statement, the reader can’t automatically 
identify by gender with man or woman. Chris O’Leary may not have 
intended to write such a profound thought, but in writing it, 
Chris accomplished something similar to what Mary Carmichel 
accomplished by writing “Chloe liked Olivia,” and in doing so 
prompted the people who read it to think and to write at least 
several more pages of comments on this discussion thread. While 
I do not take up a detailed discussion of the Chris O’Leary post 
in this dissertation, I acknowledge that Chris may have 
expressed a term, “equalist,” that might help to resolve to some 






CHAPTER 4: AESTHETICS AS A SCREEN  
 
Women have served all these centuries  
as looking-glasses possessing the magic  
and delicious power of reflecting  
the figure of man at  
twice its natural size 
 
Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (2005) 
 
 
Defining Woolfian and TPEC Aesthetics  
 
 Historically, the term aesthetics has been difficult to 
define because it inevitably involves descriptors that are not 
objective or concrete. Aesthetics is also a difficult term 
because it is used across disciplines in different ways. As 
Adorno stated, “it is self-evident that nothing concerning art 
is self-evident” (1997). I agree, and I would also argue that 
“aesthetics” is a meta-term that contains within it a multitude 
of meanings that refer to itself and to other very closely 
related concepts such as values, senses, feelings, and 
perceptions. 
 I use the term aesthetics in this dissertation as a way of 
describing what is valued in terms of feelings, perceptions, and 
senses in contemporary U.S. culture. My stance on aesthetics is 




patriarchal values and that TPECs reject many of these values 
and re-use them for their own purposes. 
 Primarily, I describe the term aesthetics as a gendered 
concept. In patriarchy, male aesthetics are privileged, and some 
of those privileges are expressed in binarial concepts such as 
dominant/submissive, male/female and man/woman, 
dominant/submissive, educated/uneducated, intelligent/ignorant, 
etc. These are aesthetic privileges that Woolf and the TPEC 
reject. One way that I take up an analysis of patriarchal 
aesthetics is by looking at embodiment in terms of seeing the 
human body as a machine. Following Woolf’s views on the value of 
androgyny, I move the idea further by analyzing the binarial 
notion of human/machine by acknowledging that humans in western 
culture are becoming human-machine, their embodiment 
incorporating human and technological characteristics that are 
no longer disassemblable prostheses, but fully embodied 
aesthetic features. 
 The following Woolfian aesthetic principles apply also to 
the TPEC.  
o Woolf’s aesthetics recognize the writer as creator as 
well as collaborator with her audience and reader. 
Woolfian aesthetics and TPEC aesthetics are 
collaborative. 
o Woolf’s aesthetics are negotiable when it comes to 




bodily and intellectually enact negotiations between 
space and place and within and outside of texts and 
technological environments. 
o Woolf’s aesthetics are relational, a give and take, 
strong and weak, male and female, man and woman, basic 
and abundant—not binarial. The TPEC performs a 
spectrum of embodiments that are negotiable depending 
on context, environment, or even whim. 
o Woolf’s aesthetics do not privilege patriarchal values 
such as individualism, colonialism, power, 
naturalizing, etc., but do privilege networks, 
connectives, affinities, experience. The TPEC embraces 
an identity that is fluid, connected through people, 
ideas, machines, and environment, and values personal 
experience as well as paid or scientific expertise. 
 TPECs participate in refashioning western cultural 
aesthetic perceptions of identity, individuality, 
interconnectedness, relationships, and power by participating in 
and influencing the aesthetics of textual technologies. For 
example, later, I describe in greater detail how computer 
technology is aesthetically masculine and therefore contains 
inherent patriarchal aesthetics. The same hierarchies valued by 
patriarchal culture are replicated in technological/digital 
tools. But the TPEC subverts these influences by re-using and 







The History of Gendered Aesthetics 
  
 Technologies, especially since the industrial revolution, 
have been and continue to be gendered, and they are gendered 
because they developed in patriarchal social and economic 
systems. In particular, computer technology is inherently 
masculine. This fact can be demonstrated by surveying the 
historical underpinnings of technological developments, 
examining the various approaches that feminist theories have 
taken toward computer technology, and finally, by situating 
Virginia Woolf’s work relative to this position and describing 
how women are using Internet technologies to increase their 
personal and collective agency. 
Walter Ong, in Orality and Literacy (1982), took a position 
on the nature of technology. Contrary to technological 
determinists, some cyberfeminists, and others, Ong believes that 
technologies develop in concert with cultural needs and desires, 
and technologies are used by cultures as vehicles that enable 
users to accomplish things that they could not accomplish with 
earlier technologies. Additionally, Ong refers to the nature of 
the human-machine interaction that occurs with computer 
technology, insisting that computers are not mere appendages or 




have actually become so ingrained in human life that they are, 
in Ong’s terms, a form of secondary orality. He states, “The 
electronic age is also an age of ‘secondary orality’, the 
orality . . . which depends on writing and print for existence” 
(3). In my view, this means that transitional western digital 
society, in which textual (print and other texts) technologies 
are ever-present and becoming embodied aspects of identities, 
depends on technology for its very existence, and the new 
technologies that develop and continue to improve on each other 
depend on each other for their very existence. This is one 
reason why the millennial generation mentioned earlier, having 
grown up knowing nothing of pre-Internet culture, is hesitant to 
embrace a pre-digital cultural ideal of silence and isolation 
that does not include technological, “always on” textual 
technologies. 
The complexity and multitude of forces that influence 
decisions, developments, and uses of technologies have outgrown 
the relatively simplistic conceptualizations of technologies 
proposed by the determinists, and feminist scholars denounce 
theories that are completely linear because linearity assumes a 
hierarchical progression of binarial notions such as first/last, 
top/bottom, lowest/highest, etc. Further, as cognitive 




within the most recent one, they have discovered the phenomenal 
intimacy of the brain’s synapses and neurological connections, 
and the remarkable adaptability of humankind’s most valuable 
organ. They realize that forces such as culture, environment and 
many others impact the development of all humans (Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch 1991) and the machines, technologies, and tools 
they choose to use. 
But because of the way the scientific humanists and others 
had ingrained into western culture the idea that the body is a 
machine, made of parts, dissassemblable and reassemblable, heat-
generating and forceful, the male-dominated world of science has 
made the contention believable that the human body is not only 
machine, but it is process, a complicated computer, but 
decipherable if we can just break down the codes that inscribe 
it.  
I believe that there has been a major shift in the 
development of computing for personal purposes in the 21st 
century because it is now possible to envision the computerized 
body (quite literally through medical technology and other 
technologies that increasingly make the body transparent) as not 
just an appendage or a prosthesis, but an integral part of the 




continue to develop cultural norms that acknowledge the 
complexities of the mind/body/machine.  
My views on the aesthetic nature of computers and the body 
are informed by feminist texts such as Woolf (1982, 2005), 
Haraway (1991), Hayles (1999, 2002), Balsamo (1999), and many 
others. Additionally, by looking at the historical positions 
taken to analyze the ways that technologies develop, I connect 
some of western culture’s understandings of technological 
(especially computer) developments with the more recent 
theorization and study of the brain and mind through cognitive 
science. For example, Bolter’s idea in Writing Space (2001) is 
remediation. Remediation, Bolter argues, means that new 
technologies incorporate aspects of former technologies into 
them. The newer technologies can carry with them remnants of 
what was good and what worked from the older technologies. In 
other words, technologies don’t just spontaneously invent 
themselves and get taken up by a culture—they emerge based on 
what the culture uses, what the culture needs, and what the 
technology promises is possible. Likewise, through studying even 
the most basic historical positions on cognitive development, we 
know that those theorists have espoused stage theories such as 
infancy, childhood, middle childhood, adolescence, etc., terms 




difficult to see the similarities in the ways the technology 
theories and cognitive theories have moved in similar 
directions: from distinct and separated to embodied, from 
universality to differentiation, from linear to circular and 
fluid. Bolter’s stance that multiple forces create environments 
in which certain applications or aspects of technologies can 
flourish is more progressive than the stringent, restrictive 
ideas of technological determinism, such as technology driving 
social developments and cultural pathways. Likewise, newer 
cognitive theories such as those of Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 
(1991), that include a multiplicity and complexity of influences 
on the brain’s development further develop formerly linear, 
rigidly categorical theories of human development. Similarly, 
through Internet technology, TPEC activists create communities 
that are not bound by the formerly restrictive notions of home, 
community, religious affiliation, the body, or territoriality.  
In summary, the Internet is a complex interaction of social 
forces that is especially informed by patriarchy, codes, 
hardware, prostheses, embodiment, and other factors that make 
its isolation as an object of study impracticable. One must 
consider all of these forces and more when analyzing the 






The Historical Aesthetics of Women and Technology 
 
 Earlier, pre-capitalist societies that were not 
industrialized were less hierarchical and were, as Kilbourne & 
Weeks (2002) stated, “based on cooperation rather than 
competition, community rather than self-interest, and usufruct 
(the right to use of another’s property)” (245). These pre-
capitalist societal norms, while they may be problematic in some 
other ways for women, hold closer to a feminist mindset than do 
most capitalist ideals such as individualism, colonialism, power 
dynamics, and the tendency to naturalize whatever the (white) 
male majority prioritizes as aesthetic, desirable, or worthy. I 
do not denounce capitalism entirely, however, because in my 
view, capitalism has a role to play in women’s potential to 
realize the admonitions of Virginia Woolf and to earn their own 
money and enjoy their own spaces/places in whatever tangible or 
intangible forms that serve that purpose. Ultimately, Web pages, 
Facebook accounts, and blogs offer new frontiers for women that 
have the potential to transform women’s lives by increasing 
their personal and collective agency outside of the realm of 
rhetorics and relationships based on power and domination and 




or unpaid work based on collectives instead of competition. To 
be clear, mine is not an essentialist stance, but I do recognize 
and acknowledge that women have been deeply enculturated through 
patriarchy to behave in certain ways that make them, somewhat 
ironically, very well suited for Internet technologies that work 
using these concepts. 
 Some of the earliest historical groupings of humans are 
genders (Kilbourne & Weeks 245). So, division among human beings 
according to gender is nothing new. But pre-capitalist societies 
tended toward gender groupings because social networks were 
based on the tasks that were typically completed by one gender 
or the other, such as men conducting civil affairs and women 
managing domestic ones. Important to note, however, is that some 
current-culture “women’s work,” such as laundry, ironing, and 
other now domesticated tasks, were formerly industrialized jobs 
performed by men who earned pay for doing them. One difference 
between then and now, however, is that after the division of 
types of labor by genders and the domestication of many of these 
jobs, such as laundry, the types of labor themselves were 
regarded equally in terms of respectability and importance. Once 
women’s domestic work became individualized, home-bound, and 
unpaid, it was devalued by the culture and the technologies 




(Kilbourne & Weeks). But the technological “advancements” such 
as in-home laundry were products of the emerging hierarchies of 
patriarchal capitalism that resulted in the preoccupation and 
predominance of class rhetorics that are so embedded as to be 
nearly invisible in western cultures today. Since the industrial 
revolution, the most used (and for a long time most respected) 
social, literary, and other criticisms have analyzed class and 
have lost track of the criticism of patriarchy, except in 
relatively small and specialized fields such as women’s studies 
and feminist studies (of course Marxism is probably the most 
famous analysis of class). The switch from valuing the “organic, 
female world view” (Kilbourne & Weeks 246) to revering the 
mechanical and sanctioning the scientific and material control 
and domination of nature and women is key to the “entrenchment 
of patriarchy” (Kilbourne & Weeks 246). 
 So, fast-forward a bit from the previously described 
masculine turn in worldview to the more recent but 
scientifically-related developments in computer technologies, 
and one can see the small step it takes to connect the values of 
entrenched and naturalized patriarchy with computer technology. 
In fact, the first computers were developed through experiments 
that were funded by U.S. and other western governments to 




so the agenda of patriarchal domination of information and 
information systems and masculine values are inextricably 
imbedded in computer technology. Studies have also shown that 
women not only contend with the ubiquitous patriarchy of the 
technology itself, they must also overcome discriminatory 
stereotypes that label them technologically incompetent, 
uninterested, or unworthy. The Facebook account “Feminism is 
Important to the 21st Century” posted Figure 8 on its page. This 
political cartoon graphically portrays Woolf’s and many other 
feminist’s views about patriarchal aesthetics as a silent, 
assumed, ingrained part of current U.S. culture and history. 
Woolf (2005) opined about government-sponsored and commissioned 
works on history that “by no possible means could middle-class 
women with nothing but brains and character at their command 
have taken part in any one of the great movements which, brought 
together, constitute the historian’s view of the past” (44). In 
other words, she seemed to be one of few who noticed that women 
were absent from history as it was recorded. And she noted how 
far from the truth those histories must have been, knowing her 
own intelligence and opinions and those of her contemporaries in 
spite of their lack of formal education and “place” at the 







Figure 8: Feminist political comic posted on Feminism is 
Important to the 21st Century Facebook account 
 
Further, as Bryson (1996) argues, “women live, 
paradoxically, in a state of intimate connection with 
technologies of re-/production and yet are represented as 
perennially inadequate—groping towards and never reaching 
competence—technophobic and Luddite” (121). But most feminists 
would not argue that women should retreat to the essentialist 
state of earth mother who is devoid of mechanical, scientific, 
and computer knowledges to escape patriarchal domination. In 




technologies “may be necessary for women’s autonomy” (Smith 13), 
and, we should not underestimate women’s ability to subvert 
underlying motives.  
 
Feminist Critiques of the Aesthetics of Computer Technology 
  
Women users of computer technology have been studied and 
theorized about by feminists. Further, women have been 
positioned by these theories relative to their use of computer 
technology (as opposed to its influence on them in the 
workplace, or the influence of its design on them, for example).  
 Liberal feminists tend to focus on the fact that most 
computer technologists are men, and therefore they create 
systems and programs that reflect male perspectives and values 
and ignore those that are valuable to women. Liberal feminists 
point to, as I stated earlier, the military origins of computer 
technology, but they also note that one of the women-friendly 
aspects of Internet technology is that the Internet is based on 
networks (originally fashioned to prevent military attacks on a 
singular, nuclear center of military knowledge/power) (Misa 
2004), and because western women have been socialized to and are 




understanding, women may enjoy an advantage when it comes to 
using the Internet. 
 Socialist feminists  such as Wajcman, Eisenstein, 
Ehrenreich, and Enloe, argue that the direction that computer 
technologies have taken is a direct result of capitalist 
interests and profit margins (Rosser 4) and that those motives 
move the decisions about developments even further away from the 
public realm (government-funded) into the private. But their 
concern is deeper than this simplified statement: there is a 
complex and often hidden relationship between publicly-funded 
research and privately held patents, copyrights, and other 
intellectual properties that cannot be easily sorted out. The 
basic thing that is at stake for socialist feminists is access—
who gets to use and who gets to benefit from government-funded 
technological developments that get privatized, and therefore 
owned, in this way? 
 There are similarities among womanist, African American, 
and radical feminist theories about computer technologies. Some 
African American and womanist feminists, for example, insist 
that gender, class, race, differing abilities, and other factors 
should be considered when technologies are developed for users. 
They ask that scientists consider “how and under what conditions 




the technology be included in the design and shape of the 
product (a form of stakeholder review). Radical feminists, in a 
similar way, might agree that users should help design 
technologies according to their needs and wishes, but they might 
also say that doing so is not possible for women because 
maleness, masculinity, and patriarchy are so “intertwined with 
technology and computer systems in our society” (Rosser 11) that 
no woman-centered technology could possibly exist within that 
framework. All three of these feminisms might agree that it is 
very difficult to imagine computer technology that is premised 
on cooperation, collaboration, and working with nature (instead 
of controlling or dominating it), though there are examples of 
computer technologies that lean in this direction, such as 
wikis, shareware, and open source applications. 
 Finally, in a related way, postmodern feminists might argue 
that the fluid nature of women’s identities requires computer 
technologies that are inclusive and relevant to the wide variety 
of constructions of women that exist. Therefore, women’s 
participation in the design and use of technologies is important 
to ensuring that their needs are addressed by the technologies 
they must use. Women in different contexts react to, embrace or 
reject, and use or ignore technologies for many reasons that are 




considerations. The problem for postmodern feminists is 
universalism—in some respects, any computer technology has to be 
universalized to some degree so that as many users as possible 
can access and benefit from it, but in making technology this 
way, it always-already excludes a great number of people who do 
not belong to the paradigm that informed the decisions and 
influenced the creation of it. 
 One of the newest, most exciting forms of feminism has 
sprung directly out of computer and Internet technology: 
Cyberfeminism. Cyberfeminism is a woman-centered perspective 
that “advocates women’s use of new information and 
communications technologies for empowerment” (Millar 200) and 
that positions these technologies as “inherently liberatory” 
(Millar 200) because women are “uniquely suited to life in the 
digital age” (Millar 200) and because of the reasons I have 
mentioned earlier, such as their socialization toward 
relationships, networking, and community-building. These 
socializations, or enculturations have become part of the 
western female aesthetic. TPECs tend to favor relational 
constructs, networked affinities, and membership in communities 





 In summary, various feminist theories have addressed the 
question of computer technology. Like them, I acknowledge the 
problems inherent in trying to establish a route for women to 
take so that they may gain personal and collective agency for 
writing and other creative pursuits by using the Internet. But I 
also find promise in the Internet’s unintended consequences, 
such as an aesthetic prioritizing of relational constructs, 
networked affinities, and membership in communities, that may 
create opportunities for women to flourish and make their 
situations better by using it. 
 
Social Science, Women, and Technology 
 
  Some social scientists who study texts and technology 
contend that the trajectory that Internet technology is taking 
is centered in many ways around its forms of social interaction 
among users. I agree. Many pre-computer age foundational texts 
by social critics such as Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, Barthes, and 
others laid the ground work for examining technological 
phenomena from myriad points of entry. Feminist scholars have 
added to the literature about the sociality of Internet 
technologies. Many fields of study intersect and divulge 




as well as the development of the ways TPECs use it for feminist 
technological textuality. 
One of the areas of conjuncture among the various fields 
that are concerned about technology is the phenomenon of 
globalization. Globalization, in my view, especially in the 
sense of a “shrinking world” would not be possible without the 
aid of computer technologies. Theorists such as Appadurai (1996) 
and Tabb (2002) question the tsunami-like force of neo-liberal 
globalization on the world and its people. They ask what is at 
stake for marginalized cultures that cannot, because of internal 
struggles and/or state indebtedness, among other reasons, 
participate and compete in the global information economy; and 
they inquire about the social responsibility of the purveyors of 
the neo-liberal globalization machine. Among the world’s poorest 
and most deprived people are women and children, so the 
intensely stratifying effects of neo-liberal globalization often 
have greater consequences for women in terms of access, poverty, 
hunger, and mobility. And even in westernized, globally powerful 
nations such as the United States, women are becoming the 
majority of the population, and thus have a greater stake in 
issues from the personal to the global. 
  Appadurai (1996) and Tabb (2002), among others, also 




who argue that forces such as global capitalism, which is in 
many ways driven by technology and digitally-instantaneous flows 
of immense amounts of money, have a flattening effect on the 
world and that the flattening contributes to a trickle-down of 
economic gain, among other benefits such as access to 
technologies, for nearly everyone . . . eventually. Manual 
Castells, who is a sociologist by training, also writes about 
the effects of being perpetually available via communication 
devices such as cell phones and PDAs and how information 
literacy is a commodity in the global world. But he questions 
this commodity’s steep price--cultural hegemony and false 
notions of prosperity that can’t be reconciled with other 
realities such as high unemployment rates, dangerous employment 
situations (especially such as women in sweat shops), lack of 
medical and social services, and in many cases, lack of basic 
infrastructures such as roads and clean water. Technology is 
intricately tied up with ‘development’ that often adversely 
affects women. 
  Sherry Turkle (1999), an anthropological sociologist from 
MIT, offers another set of questions about humans, texts, and 
technology. Her questions often revolve around what she 
perceives as a change in the way people understand their 




metaphor for this change refers to identity as being “recast in 
terms of multiple windows and parallel lives” (643). The change 
comes from the “fact that self-presentation is written in text” 
and “means that there is time to reflect upon and edit one’s 
‘composition’” (643). And her concern with this paradigm shift 
is that “the self no longer simply plays different roles in 
different settings—something that people experience, when, for 
example, one wakes up as a lover, makes breakfast as a mother, 
and drives to work as a lawyer” (644). In other words, and in 
this example she does refer explicitly to women, a woman can be 
all of these identities (or more) at one time by virtue of 
cyberspace texts and technology, but doing so can have profound 
psychological and material effects. In essence, the texts become 
the identities. And the notion of identity(ies) as texts, though 
more recent in the context of computers and the Internet, is not 
new: Those foundational theorists that I mentioned earlier were 
all about the embodiment of a person’s life texts. For example, 
in reference to Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, Turkle 
(1979) argues that his point was “in order to put into question 
assumptions deeply embedded in our ordinary language, one has to 
use language in extraordinary ways” (94). In my view, studying 
texts and their influence by, on, and within technologies, is 




cultural aesthetics perceptions of identity, individuality, 
interconnectedness, relationships, and power. Ultimately, these 
are the aspects of society that continue to perplex the TPEC and 
that continue to be addressed by feminist textual technological 
activists who host Web sites, use Facebook accounts, and write 
blogs. 
One of the biggest issues for the TPEC feminist textual 
technological activist is embodiment. And although I wrote about 
the issues surrounding embodiment in Chapter One, I return to it 
here because embodiment is always-already connected to gender. 
In particular, women’s bodies have been coerced, co-opted, used, 
marginalized, and dismissed throughout history in many ways, but 
the ways in which they are so affected by technologies and the 
rhetoric and texts that surround the technologies are 
particularly important. N. Katherine Hayles (1999) does not shy 
away from this complicated subject. Hayles, like me, is excited 
about the possibilities of a cyborg (posthuman, to use her term, 
and TPEC, to use mine) future for women. She states, “the 
posthuman evokes the exhilarating prospect of getting out of 
some of the old boxes and opening up new ways of thinking about 
what being human means” (285). Hayles also cites scholars in 
fields such as cognitive science and psychology who have argued 




any other factor in shaping contemporary worldviews and brain 
function (284). In the ways mentioned above, the theories of 
aesthetics, social science, psychology, and other disciplines 
complement feminist theories for a critical examination of the 
embodiment and spaces involved with writing in digital culture 
shed a lot of light on how the TPEC will evolve in and with 
cyberculture. 
 Further, Anne Balsamo (1999), questions the ways in which 
technologies, especially computer technologies, affect and have 
been affected by the organic bodies of women. She pursues such 
issues as the rationalization of new body technologies as “life-
enhancing and even life-saving” (5), especially through popular 
culture and the media. She argues that, though many technologies 
that affect bodies, especially the bodies of women, such as many 
modern-era kitchen appliances and in-home laundry machines, are 
purported to be time-saving, life-saving, and liberating, the 
same technologies are also used to re-assert domination over 
women by male-dominated culture, norms, and institutions. 
Technologies such as the ones listed above ostensibly liberate 
women from more labor-intensive versions of the same work, but 
within that liberation is the continued assumption that the work 
should be unpaid, home-bound, and restricted to the women for 




women should shut up and stop complaining. Balsamo (1999) 
indicates that, despite technological advances, especially those 
of the past five decades, women continue to be confined to 
restrictive roles and viewed as primarily reproductive bodies. 
Balsamo (1999) asserts that “Gender, in this schema, is both a 
determining cultural condition and a social consequence of 
technological deployment” (9). Balsamo (1999) claims that 
certain technologies “serve to reinforce traditional gendered 
patterns of power and authority” (10), and I think that she 
believes that becoming cyborgs is inevitable for women and all 
humans. However, if the inevitable is to happen, Balsamo (1999), 
similarly to Hayles, insists that we have to come to terms with 
how women’s bodies will maintain corporeal, “natural” (12) 
functioning and also assert themselves in the discourses of 
various technologies that affect them. Recognizing and 
addressing at least these two aspects of the female body, in 
Balsamo’s (1999) view, is critical to the future of women and 
feminism. In fact, both Hayles and Balsamo refer to each other 
in their work. Hayles’ (arguably) most influential text, My 
Mother Was a Computer, and Balsamo’s Technologies of the 
Gendered Body, describe to the clerical work called “computing” 
that many young women as well as Balsamo’s mother performed. 




terms. In these texts, writing theory, feminist theory, and 
theories of texts and technology work closely together to 
formulate new ways of approaching problematic cultural 
assumptions. 
 Finally, the “question concerning technology” (Heidegger 
1977), still plagues the complex nature of the Internet and 
women’s interaction with it. In The Question Concerning 
Technology, Heidegger is also concerned with essentialism in the 
sense that, to him, “technology is not equivalent to the essence 
of technology” (4). For the TPEC and feminist textual 
technological activists, I believe that Heidegger means that 
TPECs have to first uncover, reveal, or determine the underlying 
social constructs and patriarchal aesthetics that define what is 
meant by technology. In other words, technology is not simply an 
instrument or a means of production, but its essence is a 
construct itself of aesthetic expectations, societal values, 
dominant cultural norms, patriarchal hierarchies, and other 
influences. Whether the word that is used is epistemology, 
techne, or any other name, the TPEC has to consider how it comes 
to know what it knows and from what standpoint those truths are 
formulated. The TPEC questions the texts, images, labels, media, 
and other products of technology and challenges and alters 




dominate. Ronald Deibert (1997) said that some of the most 
monumental shifts in world order have been made because some 
influence brought a marginalized practice to the center. As a 
feminist, I know personally that remarkable transformation can 
occur when the voices of the “Other” can be heard. The TPEC 
activists analyzed in this dissertation are producing texts that 
bring marginalized voices to the center and expose cultural 
assumptions that can be misleading, prejudicial, and even 
dangerous. 
 
Situating Woolfian Aesthetics in an Historical Context 
 
Susan Gubar remarks in her introduction to A Room of One’s 
Own (2005) that Woolf identifies and emphasizes “the importance 
of aesthetics: the talent or gift that it is death to hide, the 
integrity of the work of art, the transformative capacities of 
the imaginative faculty in readers and in writers” (Woolf 2005 
liv). And Gubar goes on to note that,  
Woolf places the aesthetic at the center of her discussion 
of women’s issues not simply to evaluate the historical 
factors that impeded female writers in the past; not simply 
to criticize evaluative criteria that privilege the 
subjects, styles, and genres mined by men over those 
crafted by women; but to suggest the enduring vital 
influence of novels, plays, and poems on their present and 





I cite these passages because they inform my arguments about the 
aesthetics of today’s feminist textual activists. I clearly see 
a connection between what Woolf observed about aesthetics and 
what is happening today in the ways women use technology to 
construct and assert their identities, artistic abilities, 
contributions, and values in ways that change and enhance the 
cultural aesthetics of the present and future. In the example 
below, I explain further how the foundations of Woolf’s beliefs 
about aesthetics are performed by marginalized people who use 
technologies that Woolf may never have imagined would be 
available to perform activist work. To frame this argument, I 
draw on globalization theorist Appadurai’s (1996) notion of 
‘scapes’ to illustrate the impact that Internet technologies 
such as Facebook can have on not only personal, local subjects, 
but importantly, on a global-level issue that affects women and 






The Aesthetics of Activist Scapes 
 
Arjun Appadurai (1996) identifies five theoretical “scapes” 
in his 1996 book, Modernity at Large, which I contend can be 
applied to the phenomenon of women using technology to write in 
activist ways. The first four scapes are mediascape, ideoscape, 
ethnoscape, and financescape. The fifth scape, technoscape, in 
my view, permeates all of the other scapes so inseparably that 
it can no longer remain a stand-alone scape as Appadurai (1996) 
initially identified it. In other words, the technoscape is a 
common element throughout all scapes, and it is intimately 
rather than marginally connected to all four. These four  
technology-enhanced scapes show “fluid, irregular[ity]” 
(Appadurai 33), which is an aesthetic quality of writing that 
Woolf employed and that is present in the writing that women 
perform using Internet-based technologies. Appadurai’s (1996) 
scapes are a good tool for examining textual technologies’ 
influence on culture and the status of women in local and global 
contexts. 
Appadurai (1996) defines ethnoscapes as “the landscape of 
persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: 
tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other 




this list the broader category of women, who often make up the 
majority of the immigrants, refugees, exiles, and guestworkers 
that Appadurai (1996) categorizes. The ethnoscape also includes 
those individuals, groups, and systems that would protect others 
who have no voice or agency to protect themselves, and often 
those people are women and children. The ethnoscape permeates 
borders and shifts the power of economics and politics (which 
are parts of the financescape) from the elite to the masses. 
The Internet, as an ethnoscape system, connects the 
ethnoscape with the technoscape to produce movement across 
borders of all kinds—gender, class, and ethnicity, for example--
and it provides mobility of collective voices through 
technological textuality such as e-mail petitions that garner 
virtual signatures and represent the voices of people who are 
adversely affected by the actions of other people, corporations, 
laws, and other potential oppressors. 
In one excellent example of an activist techno-ethnoscape 
at work, I cite the story of Minal Hajratwala, author of the 
book Leaving India (2009)(see Figure 9). As a recently published 
author, from time to time, Hajratwala would check Amazon.com for 
the rankings of her book sales. One day, she tried to find her 




recounted that they had looked for her book on Amazon.com and 
couldn’t find it either. 
 
Figure 9: Leaving India by Minal Hajratwala 
 
Leaving India (is a book about many aspects of Hajratwala’s 
immigrant experience, and part of that experience is her coming 
of age as an Indian lesbian. But that is a relatively small part 
of the book overall, which deals with Indian history, culture, 
and customs, as well as the more standard immigrant experience 




Amazon.com reviewers of her book had tagged it as lesbian. That 
in itself was no problem for her, but their doing so led 
Amazon.com to flag the book “adult,” and relegate it to searches 
only accessible to adults who are allowed to search for mature 
material. In a second policy assault, her book was no longer 
being ranked because of its place in the adult category. 
Hajratwala’s book is by no stretch of the imagination 
pornographic or obscene yet Amazon.com refused its customers 
access to it based on the one word “lesbian” that appeared in 
customer reviews.  
Hajratwala went online and discovered that “she wasn't the 
only lesbian and gay author to have this experience. It was even 
affecting classics by James Baldwin and Virginia Woolf” (Sydell 
2009). And soon, her experiences were chronicled in online fora 
such as Facebook and Twitter. Sydell stated, “Hajratwala was one 
of many authors who wrote about it on Facebook and this weekend, 
it was all over Twitter” (Sydell 2009). Further, the Hajratwala 
case, along with the cases of other authors to whom this had 
happened, spurred an Internet-based activist campaign against 
Amazon.com, which was flooded by complaint emails and petitions 
from users who were against relegating contemporary authors as 
well as authors of classic literature to adult-only searches. 




the Lambda Literary Foundation, claimed, “the reaction has been 
something of a testament to Internet activism” (Sydell 2009) 
that ultimately led Amazon.com to reverse its policy. And 
although Amazon.com claimed to NPR that “it was an embarrassing 
and ham-fisted catalog error,” as of April 2009, Amazon.com 
officials stated that they are “fixing the problem” (Sydell 
2009) and as of July 2010 they have adjusted their policy to 
more carefully screen explicit content and not categorically 
exclude gay material. The full back story of Hajratwala’s 
experience can be found on her blog at 
http://www.minalhajratwala.com/2009/04/amazon-and-invisibility/. 
By moving the imaginative constructs that were made 
possible by the ethno-technoscape into action, the Facebook-
informed Amazon.com petitioners became a powerful “global force, 
forever slipping in and through the cracks” (Appadurai 41) of 
emerging, porously-bordered Internet technology. Through the 
technologies of Facebook and Twitter, people who may have been 
otherwise separated or limited by geography (nations as well as 
states), able-embodiment, or marginalized because of their 
sexuality, gained agency to affect change in corporate policy 





According to Appadurai (1996), financescapes are “the very 
complex fiscal and investment flows” (34) that link economies. 
There is no doubt that Amazon.com is a global entity, and the 
example of the Internet-based textual technological campaign 
above shows how marginalized individuals can act as a like-
minded group to affect the business practices of a global 
financial conglomerate. Further, this example illustrates that 
all of the scapes, including the financescape, can no longer be 
separated from the technoscape—the activists in this Amazon.com 
scenario literally embodied the techno-financescape of 
contemporary culture to enact change. Additionally, the feminist 
adage that the personal is political was also enacted here—and 
expanded to the idea that the personal is techno-financial. Not 
only were these individual authors’ livelihoods at stake because 
of Amazon.com’s policy, but because of the global forum that 
Amazon.com operates in, their actions affected a world-wide 
corporate financial policy that has implications that far 
outreach the individuals who performed the technological 
textuality in this case. 
Further, the Amazon.com example also entered the 
mediascape, which, according to Appadurai (1996), refers to the 
distribution of electronic capabilities that produce and 




television stations, and film-production studios, which are now 
available throughout the world, and to the images of the world 
created by these media (35). In this example, mediascapes freed 
the imagination and allowed readers (or consumers of Amazon.com 
products) and “others living in other places” (Appadurai 35) to 
join together to develop an imagined community that held real-
world power and influence.  As demonstrated above, mediascapes 
worked in concert with technoscapes, overlapping and propelling 
one another. In this example, mediascapes were facilitated 
through technoscapes, the technologies that allow distribution 
of information and imagination, to form the hybrid techno-
mediascape. The activists’ imaginations helped them script a set 
of ideals beyond the daily experiences of the individual (who 
may or may not have labeled herself an activist in real life), 
that became the impetus for “acquisition and movement” (36) in 
the techno-media and techno-financescapes.   
Appadurai (1996) attests that “Ideoscapes are also 
concatenations of images, but they are often directly political 
and frequently have to do with . . . ideologies and 
“counterideologies” (36).  Additionally, the ideoscape and the 
ethnoscape are linked by a conjuncture: The ideoscapes are 
concerned with slippery terms such as “freedom, welfare, rights, 




a techno-ideoscape formed because of concerns over freedom, 
rights, and representation. A powerful imag/e/in/nation produced 
by the techno-ethnoscapes, techno-financescapes, techno-
mediascapes and techno-ideoscapes of the Amazon.com case 
resulted in activist success. 
  
Cultural Aesthetics and Fluidity 
 
Another observation that Woolf makes about aesthetics 
occurs on a cultural level. She remarks in A Room of One’s Own 
(2005) that “women have served all these centuries as looking-
glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting 
the figure of man at twice its natural size” (35), and she 
continues, “How is he to go on giving judgment, civilizing 
natives, making laws, writing books, dressing up and 
speechifying at banquets, unless he can see himself at breakfast 
and at dinner at least twice the size he really is” (36)? And 
further, while, in Woolf’s assessment, men have garnered all of 
the authority to pronounce the courses and great accomplishments 
of history, they have done so at the expense of women by not 
acknowledging women’s roles in the development of the world 
except in the cases of the most famous of queens and great 




accounts of middle-class women who did everyday things to 
influence culture or resist the patriarchal systems that 
dominate them (such as the suffragist movement, of which she was 
a part). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what time women 
would have had to engage in any material or non-material 
pursuits at all, because, according to historical records, women 
“had no tradition behind them, or one so short and partial that 
it was of little help” (Woolf 2005 75). And even if women had 
historical documents written by men at their disposal and 
discretion, Woolf argues, and I agree, that these accounts would 
have been incorrect, misleading, and wrong on many levels, 
especially including the aesthetic. Historical accounts 
typically universalize patriarchal aesthetics, so, even if they 
had included accounts of everyday women and their influence on 
culture, society, and commerce, they would have been 
fundamentally inaccurate because, as Woolf states, “we think 
back through our mothers if we are women” (75). The aesthetic 
practice of “thinking back through our mothers” continues to 
influence the writing that TPECs produce and the approach they 
take to observing the culture in which they live. 
 Woolf’s views on aesthetics shed light on how women can 
move on from the restrictive and prevailing attitudes and 




and ultimately for me, it came down to the fact that, “these 
monsters” (Woolf 2005 44), the women who are depicted in 
histories, “however amusing to the imagination, have no 
existence in fact. What one must do to bring her to life is to 
think poetically and prosaically at one and the same moment, 
thus keeping in touch with fact” (Woolf 2005 44). What this 
means in the contemporary context of the TPEC is that TPECS 
transform patriarchal aesthetics into collaborative aesthetics 
that are not based on a necessarily solitary culmination, but a 
distributed, non-linear, shared set of experiences that are 
personal and specific.  
 There are scholars, especially in contemporary theoretical 
circles, who observe that similar characteristics are important 
to authentic historical and experiential accounts of every day 
culture and life. For example, Ulmer’s concept of “mystory” is 
one such way of approaching writing that, in an aesthetic sense, 
resonates with what Woolf was calling for. In other words, the 
author must not try to extract herself in restraint or false 
objectivity from the writing that she produces; she is always-
already present within it and her very existence, in historical 
terms at least, is at stake. Similar observations are made by 
Donna Haraway (1991), for example, when she writes about women’s 




studies. Haraway (1991) advocated for a standpoint theory of 
scientific inquiry in which the former objective, removed 
scientific observer would be replaced by a scientist who 
acknowledged her own participation and influence on the study 
and accounted for those influences in the reporting of her work. 
In similar ways, TPECs have enacted new forms of writing that 
employ the scientific, the aesthetic, and the cultural. My 
observations and analyses of feminist technological textuality 
add to this body of work.  
Woolf observed long before the invention of transitory 
textual technologies such as Web sites, Facebook, and blogs, 
that “at any rate, . . . it is notoriously difficult to fix 
labels of merit in such a way that they do not come off” (104). 
In other words, the scene on the screen of technological 
textuality is constantly changing at nearly the same rate at 
which the technologies themselves evolve. It is too early in the 
process of enacting textual technological activist gestures to 
determine their enduring or lasting value to western culture. 
But, I imagine myself peeling away some of the “labels of merit” 
that have been perpetuated through U.S. patriarchal culture by 
analyzing and performing the transgressive aesthetic writing 





Participation, Pitch, Politics, and Power 
 
Interestingly, though Woolf was incensed by many cultural 
norms that negatively affected women, she preferred a quiet 
feminism that was not about protesting vociferously or making 
demands in public--feminism that in more recent decades has been 
referred to as armchair feminism or everyday feminism. For 
example, Lee (1998) wrote of Woolf, “Woolf’s writing was always 
explicitly on the radical, subversive and modern side” (274) . . 
. but “screams of rage and pain are not what she wants to hear 
from other women, or what she allows herself” (17). However, 
Woolf was involved in, even if not always radically outspoken 
about, some impactful movements of her era, such as the cause 
for women’s suffrage, political satire and critique (the 
Dreadnought Hoax is her most famous), and her public commentary 
about post-expressionism. Moreover, “her own skeptical 
resistance to authority, and her horror of being dominated . . . 
meant that she was always against a coercive government” (Lee 
524). In fact, Lee (1998) identifies some of Woolf’s activities 
as having legitimate “historical weight” (275) and notes that, 
“in 1910, [Woolf] was involved with three events which came to 
be read as connected expressions of British subversiveness: the 




Impressionist exhibition” (275). Though “she would not join up . 
. . she was also a political participant” and “this position was 
fundamental to her feminism” (Lee 524). In all of these 
instances, Woolf clearly exhibited aspects of her alternative 
selves and found satisfaction, pleasure, and validity in doing 
so.  
 In a similar way, 21st century Internet culture provides 
evidence that women from all varieties of circumstances, 
educational levels, and relationship and employment statuses 
continue to pursue their interests and identities through 
activities that may prove to be historically and politically 
important, even if they remain relatively quietly carried out. 
For instance, in 2008, many women became more deeply involved in 
voting because for the first time in history, a viable woman 
presidential candidate was on the ticket (Hillary Clinton), as 
well as a promising minority feminist man (Barack Obama). In 
these candidates, women in record numbers became engaged with 
the progression of the political election process and expressed 
themselves through the right to vote. Moreover, much of that 
campaign was conducted in cyberspace, and Hillary Clinton, a 
woman presidential candidate who held that status well after a 
number of more traditional white male candidates had conceded, 




information, and engaging in fundraising opportunities through 
her campaign Web site. Barack Obama, the eventual winner of that 
presidential election, also engaged his constituents through 
progressive rhetoric and historic levels of participation 
through political technological textuality. Media in general 
were intimately and intricately involved in every aspect of this 
long, unprecedented presidential race, securing a marker in 
historical terms of a sea change in expectations for political 
candidates and their campaigns with regard to their use of a 
variety of media, including Internet technology. I conclude that 
because of this monumental increase in the use of Web sites, 
Facebook accounts, and blogs to inform the general public about 
political campaigns and their candidates, the feminist adage 
that “the personal is political” has entered a new age and has 
earned a fresh meaning that resonates with the middle class 
women that Woolf saw so much promise in and who are becoming 
today’s TPECs. 
 In her recurring satirical spot entitled “Target Women” on 
Current TV and current.com, TPEC Sarah Haskins has used 
television and Web site media to sardonically criticize 
stereotypical media portrayals of women. She, too, commented on 
the media spectacle that was the 2008 presidential campaign in 






Figure 10: Current.com's Sarah Haskins' segment "Obama Arms" 
 
In this segment, Haskins exposes with the cultural 
phenomenon of objectifying women, criticizing women of power and 
intellect, and assuming that there is nothing of substance to 
talk about with regard to women because, in the end, all they 
care about is beauty, popularity, and fashion. Following is the 
transcript of this segment: 
Sarah Haskins: Michelle Obama has been in office just over 
100 days. And she is already caught up in a constitutional 
controversy. The culprit, that pesky second amendment, the 
right to bear arms. (kisses each of her biceps) 
 





(These are some clips of the many TV news stories about 
Obama’s “right to bare arms.”) 
 
First lady Michelle Obama has ignited a controversy over 
her right to bear arms. And we’re not talking about weapons 
here, but her actual arms!  
An unlikely proponent of your right to bear arms: A 
Democrat! Michelle Obama is not working out with the NRA, 
but she has been flaunting her guns of late. 
  
The first lady’s sense of style and of course her toned 
arms have been generating a lot of fashion buzz lately, and 
of course speculation as to whether bare arms are 
appropriate for all occasions. 
 
Sarah Haskins: America is a nation with a puritan legacy. 
So a first lady without sleeves is a shock to our system. 
We need to express our concerns about her blatant arm 
nudity. Luckily, the first amendment protects our right to 
sound super dumb in man on the street interviews.  
 
First interviewee (female): You look better when you’re 
fully clothed. 
 
Second interviewee (male): I love it. If he screws up, I’m 
in there. She’s a nice tall girl.  
 
Third interviewee (who is wearing a tank top): I think she 
should look a little more presentable.  
 
Interviewer: So you think that the sleeveless is a little 
too much that you’ve seen her in? [sic] 
 
Third interviewee: Yea. 
 
Sarah Haskins: Point taken . . . lady not wearing sleeves! 
But behind the controversy lies another question: Why would 
she do this? 
 
Another excerpt from a TV newscast: 
 
Well, some believe that the first lady is willing to bare 
her arms because she’s unwilling to show much of her legs 










Figure 11: Screen shot of Michelle Obama in Haskins' "Obama 
Arms" segment 
 
And just when armsgate ‘09 seemed to be at its boiling 
point, a USA today survey conclusively proved that we 
really don’t give a shit. 
 
We don’t want her to not bare her arms, we just want her to 







Figure 12: Screen shot of Sarah Haskins' "Obama Arms" segment 
 
A clip of Kirstie Ally on the Oprah Winfrey Show: 
 
I’m like look Michelle Obama’s guns, I’m like, I could have 
those arms! 
 
More news stories about how to get Michelle Obama arms: 
 
Newscaster to a show guest (feeling her arms): Oh my god, 
she’s like Michelle Obama arms! 
 
You too could have the same amazing arms as the first lady. 
 
Women all over are asking their fitness trainers, how do I 
get arms like hers? 
 
You want Michelle Obama arms? That’s easy, just hop right 
down on your big ball. 
 
Sarah Haskins: I know what you’re thinking. Are we going to 




Probably yes. Sooner or later, the whole country is going 
to go to Princeton, then Harvard, then be Barack Obama’s 
boss, then be an executive at the University of Chicago 
hospitals, and then support local sustainable food 
initiatives with a garden, and then . . . have sweet 




Figure 13: Screen shot of Haskins' "Obama Arms" segment 
 
You can pry my guns out of my cold dead hands, but that’s 
going to be hard, because my hands (holding out hands). . . 
are attached to my guns (holding arms in bodybuilder pose). 
  
Haskins shares her opinion of the media’s portrayal of 
accomplished, smart women through comedy. Using the digital 
media of TV and the Web, Haskins situates herself in a digital 
room of her own in which she can write and perform in feminist 




media. And it has worked. She has garnered a good reputation, a 
solid number of fans, and her work as a TPEC has launched her 
career to new levels. Moreover, she has succeeded in bringing 
light to the politics of the TPEC, and she has exposed the 
sexism inherent in U.S. culture through her creative use of 
words and images. Her TPEC activism is becoming a mainstream 
cultural pathway to an aesthetic that challenges patriarchal 
assumptions about women, intelligence, and beauty. 
If she had seen it and used it, Woolf might have agreed 
that the Internet is a valuable tool for enacting one’s politics 
as well as a venue for participating via a more subtle entry 
point, yet she also might have found it, as many contemporary 
women do, a powerful method of self-expression. But more than 
that, as Lee (1998) stated about Woolf, “her late writing links 
the old battle for the vote to women’s struggle for empowerment 
in all areas: to earn their living, to escape the sexual double 
standard and to gain equal opportunities in education” (277). 
Woolf’s writing was her expressive outlet for deeply troubling 
concerns for women, who, in her culture and indeed in her own 
personal familial experience, having been denied a formal 
education by her own father, were considered “the intellectual 
inferiors of men” (Lee 282). Unfortunately, she began to 




the end of her life. In her 1941 diary, she wrote, “the idea 
came to me that why I dislike, and like, so many things 
idiosyncratically now, is because of my growing detachment from 
the hierarchy, the patriarchy . . . I am I: and must follow that 
furrow, not copy another” (Woolf 1954 346). Who knows what 
masterpieces might have come from her pen in her elder years of 
self-realization had she not committed suicide at 59. One can 
only speculate. 
 
The Aesthetic Situation of the TPEC 
 
 I argue that the TPEC resides among the theories of 
aesthetics described earlier in this chapter. I admire women’s 
use of Internet technologies to increase their personal and 
collective agency and to enact everyday forms of feminist 
technological textuality. The TPEC is a cyberfeminist in that 
one of its basic principles is to challenge male-centered 
culture (especially of the Internet) and imprint women’s models 
of open and accessible computer-mediated communication on new 
technologies (Luckman 36). The implementation does not 
necessarily take the form of participation in role-playing games 
(though many cyberfeminists emerged because of gaming 




implementation is not a technological-determinist venture, 
though some cyberfeminists think that Internet technology can 
save the world. The TPEC operates from the perspective of a 
feminist who uses computer technologies as a central part of its 
“everyday, lived feminist politics” (Luckman 37). And although 
cyberfeminism has been associated primarily with young women in 
their teens and twenties, older TPECs such as Sarah Haskins and 
mom-101, who are in their 30s, as well as Katherine Hayles, who 
is considerably older than these two generations, and others, 
also use technologies in similar ways and lead our culture in 
determining more useful, efficient, and creative ways to use the 
Internet to organize, maintain, and manage extremely busy lives, 
multiple roles, and shifting identities as well as to engage in 
right/writ/ing some of the wrongs that are committed against 
women as a gender group. Donna Haraway (1991) inspired and, in 
my view, founded TPEC feminism, and her cyborgs resonate with 
the TPEC as cyberfeminists because through them, she advocates 
new ways of operating, relating to others, and managing women’s 
lives in a world of “partial subjectivities” (147, 196).  
 Luckman argued that “women excel within fluid systems and 
processes” and that they have already become adept at 
recognizing these familiar patterns in digital technologies, 




of the first electronic fiction books, Patchwork Girl. The TPEC 
agrees with womanist, African American, and postmodern feminists 
that there is probably no way for any computer technology to 
include all women, all the time, but it recognizes that women 
will probably be the first to exploit the metaphor of the 
Internet as a “multiple, distributed system” (Luckman 41) to 
their advantage. In doing so, however, the TPEC cautions women 
that any electronic freedom and any emergent digital body, 
because of their locations in a “gendered, raced, classed, and 
geographically” (Luckman 42) conditioned patriarchal world, will 
exclude many and include only few unless and until women succeed 






CHAPTER 5: ALWAYS-ALREADY SCREENED: MISOGYNY AND THE ECONOMICS 
OF ENOUGH 
 
There was an enormous body  
of masculine opinion to the effect  
that nothing could be expected  
of women intellectually 
 
Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (2005) 
 
 
One example of women of relative privilege in the U.S. who 
are helping women maquiladora workers on the Mexican-U.S. border 
empower themselves to improve their lives through creative uses 
of technology is La Casa de la Mujer--Grupo Factor X. Some women 
from Grupo Factor X participated in the making of a documentary 
film entitled Maquilapolis, (see Figure 14) which is about the 
young Mexican women who work in maquiladoras. Maquiladoras are 
U.S.-owned factories that moved across the border because of 
relaxed trade agreements like NAFTA. These women are taking 
action to improve their work environments by affiliating with 
U.S.-based feminist groups that provide them with video cameras, 
union information, and other resources. And, through computer 
technologies that help them communicate and make connections 
with other oppressed workers and their allies, coalitions of 
feminist groups and sweatshop workers across the globe are 
coming together to increase their power and influence. Though 




flow of texts, resources, technologies, people, and information 
is key to these women’s empowerment. Particularly poignant, 
moving, and equally important are the non-traditional methods 
these women have used to document their environments and appeal 
for help on a much larger scale using digital film technology 
that resonates with larger, ostensibly more powerful and 
influential, groups of people who spread their message and 
thereby give them leverage in asserting their rights (see Figure 
14). 
 
Figure 14: Film still from Maquilapolis (2007), featuring some 






 Another example of Grupo Factor X’s use of Internet 
technology to continue the awareness campaign and to garner 
financial, political, and activist support of its efforts 
includes the group’s making and maintaining contacts with other 
organizations throughout the world using digital technologies to 
initiate publicity campaigns within companies and government 
institutions, which allows the maquiladoras and their allies to 
stay informed and to further generate a self-sufficient and 
active organization (Grupo Factor X 2010). 
 The work of the women maquiladoras in Grupo Factor X and 
the others who participated in the making of Maquilapolis, as 
well as other similar organizations in Baja, California and 
elsewhere, further Woolf’s argument about the importance of the 
middle class woman who writes. In most respects, the maquiladora 
workers cannot be considered even lower middle class—they are 
poor and have few and unreliable life-sustaining resources such 
as food, water, shelter, and sanitation. Yet, through textual 
technologies such as documentary film-making and Internet 
coalition building via the help of others, they are able to 
mobilize for their own interests and manifest in a literal and 





Figure 15: A room in Delfina's house, under construction. Photo 
by Luz Aida Ruiz Martinez, Grupo Factor X  
 
Woolf and Misogyny 
 
A great deal of Woolf’s thoughts in A Room of One’s Own 
(2005) are about the misogyny and the rule of the father that 
are ingrained in western patriarchal society. She questions many 
things about the culture in which she lives, a culture that 
objectifies and devalues women, and she critically examines how 




full potential as human beings. In the introduction to A Room of 
One’s Own (2005), Susan Gubar observes that Woolf probes “not 
only the causes but also the consequences of misogyny” (Gubar 
2005 liii), but also how “self-confidence [is] undermined . . . 
by interdictions against female intellectual ambition” (Gubar 
2005 liii). Indeed, Woolf was well-read in psychology, and 
Freud, whom many feminists in the 21st century clearly identify 
as a misogynist, was gaining popularity during her time. His 
works influenced Woolf’s writing and her reactions to 
explanations and declarations that were made about women, their 
psychological faculties, and their behavior. In fact, Gubar 
observes that “the psychology of creativity forms the central 
core of her genealogical thinking about the differences between 
male and female artistry. Under what circumstances, she wants to 
know, does incandescent creativity become deformed by self-
destructive humility or bitterness” (Gubar 2005 liii)—
characteristics that Woolf found to be ever present in women so 
that they generally doubted their very ability to qualify as 
creative beings in any sense of the word. In fact, Woolf 
observed about the psychological literature about women that 
“there was an enormous body of masculine opinion to the effect 
that nothing could be expected of women intellectually” (Woolf 




construct because, as a matter of fact, she was quite 
intelligent herself, self-taught and schooled by her brother, 
well-read, and even respected among some contemporary male 
intellectuals. She knew the prognostications of the various 
experts were untrue about her and about many other women who, 
given an opportunity and “enough,” could participate in and add 
value to their environments. In one of her deepest and most 
heart-felt observations, Woolf prophetically stated about the 
women’s conundrum, “I thought how unpleasant it is to be locked 
out; and I thought how it is worse perhaps to be locked in” 
(Woolf 2005 24). She movingly writes about how so many women, 
even to this day, feel about living within patriarchy, even 
those who don’t know intellectually against what they are 
struggling: fighting to gain foothold within the constructs of a 
society that doesn’t allow women to fully engage and 
participate, even when success is realized, is often bitter-
sweet and dissatisfying to women because, once “in,” they face 
alienation, envy, and jealousy from those who remain without as 
well as emptiness of meaning within themselves because the 
“inside” remains aesthetically barren, intellectually 
unrewarding, and materially insufficient. The balance that 
ideally could exist between the man-womanly and the woman-manly 




 Woolf maintains that observers from outside of her own 
culture and experience could ultimately “not fail to be aware, 
even from this scattered testimony, that England is under the 
rule of patriarchy. Nobody in their senses could fail to detect 
the dominance of the professor” (Woolf 2005 33). 
 Woolf further explains her understanding of patriarchy and 
misogyny by acknowledging that, throughout history and 
literature, as stated earlier, women have been practically non-
existent except in the sense that they are objectified or 
portrayed as mystical, puzzling, but spiritually powerful 
creatures. She observes that because of this,  
a very queer, composite being thus emerges. Imaginatively 
she is of the highest importance; practically she is 
completely insignificant. She pervades poetry from cover to 
cover; she is all but absent from history. She dominates 
the lives of kings and conquerors in fiction; in fact she 
was the slave of any boy whose parents forced a ring upon 
her finger. Some of the most inspired words, some of the 
most profound thoughts in literature fall from her lips; in 
real life she could hardly read, could scarcely spell, and 
was the property of her husband (Woolf 2005 43).  
 
Further, Woolf observes, “she never writes her own life and 
scarcely keeps a diary” (Woolf 2005 44) because she has to bear 
the burden of the practical.  
 In fact, Woolf’s own diary reveals very personal and 
intimate thoughts that relate to the ideas that she voiced 




loathing are evident in her private thoughts when she writes 
about her anticipation of the impending publication of A Room of 
One’s Own (2005), “It is a little ominous that Morgan (E.M. 
Forster) won’t review it. It makes me suspect that there is a 
shrill feminine tone in it which my intimate friends will 
dislike . . . also I shall be attacked for a feminist and hinted 
at for a Sapphist . . . I am afraid it will not be taken 
seriously” (Woolf 1954 145). Many of her intimate friends were 
the famous men of Bloomsbury, accomplished thinkers and authors 
themselves. She naturally wants their approval, but her elation 
followed by insecurities upon finishing a book, essay, or other 
piece of writing, occur throughout her life. Indeed, she laments 
that the periods between writings, when she is not at work, are 
when she suffers most from her bouts with depression and mental 
illness (Woolf 1954 1954).  
For Woolf, the work of writing was her salvation and her 
refuge. Without it, she was literally driven mad. This tug-of-
war between her desire to write and be respected among 
significant authors and the culture of her time, which dictated 
the inadequacies of women in any form of paid work, but 
especially intellectual work, contributed significantly to her 
ultimate suicide. It is clear from reading her A Writer’s Diary 




her various works of fiction, review, and essay. In her diary on 
Thursday, December 31st, 1936, she writes, “I could make some 
interesting and perhaps valuable notes on the absolute necessity 
for me of my work. Always to be after something” (Woolf 1954 
264). Later, she writes, “I stop working [and] I feel that I am 
sinking down, down. And as usual I feel that if I sink further I 
shall reach the truth . . . I shall make myself face the fact 
that there is nothing—nothing for any of us. Work, reading, 
writing are all disguises” (Woolf 1954 141). And in the year of 
her death, 1941, she writes, “A battle against depression, 
rejection . . . this trough of despair, shall not, I swear, 
engulf me. The solitude is great . . . The house is damp . . . 
But there is no alternative . . . ‘Your true life, like mine, is 
in ideas’ Desmond (McCarthy) said to me once” (Woolf 1954 350). 
The cultural misogyny Woolf experienced with regard to her 
writing was nearly always couched in praise of her work and 
qualified by many of her male reviewers as good work “for a 
woman.” While some of her insecurity may have been due to 
untreated mental illness, some of her reasons for anxiety about 
reviews and rejection of her work were very real. Woolf 
struggled and ultimately failed to balance her need to work, 
think, and write with the cultural expectation to be pleasant, 




Moreover, Woolf observed that it wasn’t just that women 
were ignored and marginalized throughout history, but they were 
additionally “snubbed, slapped, lectured and exhorted. Her mind 
must have been strained and her vitality lowered by the need of 
opposing this, of disproving that” (Woolf 2005 54). In other 
words, not only did she have to live within the constraints of 
the very narrow allowances provided to women in patriarchal 
culture, she also often endured literal abuse and suspicion. 
Additionally, Woolf observed that “almost without exception 
[women] are shown in their relation to men . . . all the great 
women of fiction were, until Jane Austen’s day, not only seen by 
the other sex, but seen only in relation to the other sex” 
(Woolf 2005 81). 
 Because she witnessed the situation of women in her own 
culture and as a result of the history that she studied well, 
Woolf remarked that “nothing is known about women before the 
eighteenth century” (Woolf 2005 45), and it was this notion that 
informed her feminism and spurred her to encourage women to 
write about themselves, for themselves, and for their mothers 
and daughters so that history, including the history of women, 
would not remain unwritten and unacknowledged. In my view, Web 
pages, Facebook updates, and blogs are this century’s 




anthropologists and social scientists will dig into to mine the 
nuggets that began a TPEC culture that is more inclusive of 
women even though they may also unearth some trainwrecks and 
reified misogynistic fossils. They will see that women are 
contributing to dispelling myths, exposing the effects of 
patriarchy on the status of women, and using technology to 
engage in everyday textuality that, intentional or not, promotes 
the independence, autonomy, safety, and respect of women in U.S. 
culture. 
Woolf’s screening of culture through critiquing 
misogynistic practices can be used to evaluate the following 
post from the Web site Jezebel.com. In this September 17, 2010, 
posting, contributor Dodai Stewart provided the following post, 
based on an inquiry from a Jezebel.com reader (See Figure 16-
19). The reader describes her encounter with another user who 
approached her on the social networking site OKCupid. OKCupid is 
a free social networking Web site that allows users to instant 
message each other, phone each other privately via their 
personal phones whose numbers have been masked by the site, and 
otherwise interact. This post demonstrates the condundrum that 
social networking sites place women in. In some senses the 
practice is liberatory in that any woman with access to an 




like-minded people who share her interests and background or who 
might be interested in dating or friendship. But she may not 
have known that the site is well-known for its reputation as a 
casual sex hook-up “location,” which obviously put the woman in 
this exchange in an awkward, difficult, and insulting position 
that she could not initially control.  
In the comments to the post shown in Figure 18 and 19, 
visitors to Jezebel.com share their thoughts and reactions to 
such blatant misogyny and racism on the part of the man who 
initiated the online conversation. It is clear from the comments 
to this post that many Jezebel.com readers are feminists who 
call sexism, misogyny, and racism what it is. The commentators 
give voice to other women to whom similar interactions have 
happened but who may not have had a community of supporters to 
defend them after such an abrasive encounter. In these ways, 
Jezebel.com screens U.S. culture through the lens of misogyny 
and moves the discussion of misogynistic men from margin to 
center, using new technology-enhanced methods that were not 
available to Woolf. Jezebel.com enlightens contemporary culture 
by encouraging its readers to learn about misogyny and racism in 
contemporary culture and speak out against hatred of and 





















Figure 19: Jezebel.com OKCupid interaction transcript Part 2 and 
analysis by Dodai Stewart 
 
 Stewart, the poster, points out the obvious racist aspects 
of this post in her commentary. But if we were to additionally 




points could also be made in addition to the comments that 
Jezebel.com readers provided. 
• The offender is apparently a white man. Would he speak this 
way to a white woman on OKCupid or does he reserve his 
misogyny for women he perceives as “black?”  
• Let’s say he was trying to be humorous. Humor is no longer 
funny when it degrades a woman. 
• In A Room of One’s Own, Woolf noted that men in patriarchy 
treat women “not so much that she shall be inferior as that 
he shall be superior, which plants him wherever one looks . 
. . even when the risk to himself seems infinitesimal and 
the suppliant humble and devoted” (54). In other words, 
there was no provocation of this interaction by the woman, 
other than her having a registered account on OKCupid. This 
man assumed power over her by immediately writing 
derogatory words without any sense of whether she might be 
offended. His default assumption was that her thoughts and 
feelings didn’t matter at all or certainly mattered less 
than his.  
The Fluidity of Sexuality 
 
After she had married, Woolf expressed dissatisfaction with 
the confining aspects of marriage on women, while at the same 
time, she acknowledged the societal necessity of being married 
for her ability to write and be published. Figure 20 shows a 
photo of a feminist button that was posted on the Facebook page 
Feminism is Important to the 21st Century that Woolf might have 




years, Woolf wrote about the possibilities in remaining single 
or being married when she stated,  
O how blessed it would be never to marry, or grow old; but 
to spend one’s life innocently and indifferently among the 
trees and rivers which alone can keep one cool and 
childlike in the mist of the troubles of the world! 
Marriage or any other great joy would confuse the clear 
vision which is still mine. And at the thought of losing 
that, I cried in my heart, ‘no, I will never leave you—for 




Figure 20: Don't marry be happy button from Feminism is 
Important to the 21st Century Facebook page 
 
Later, Lee (1998) wrote of Woolf’s husband Leonard, with 
whom Woolf ran Hogarth Press, “He may have constrained her, but 
he also provided conditions favourable for writing” and “It is 
clear how much he admired her strenuous work habits and how much 
she would have felt that admiration” (332). Similarly, in many 




such as heterosexual marriages, express themselves through 
online fora such as blogs, interest groups, self-publishing, 
Internet-based businesses, and even in relatively simple Web 
surfing and purchasing. In many instances, these activities are 
well within the range of acceptable behavior for women who 
otherwise hold traditional roles but who, by their involvement 
with and participation in an emerging culture, may become 
leaders in and shapers of the larger culture in which they live. 
Alexander (2005) noted the historical importance of women 
winning the right to vote on Woolf’s and other women’s 
participation in writing.  She stated, “one of the effects of 
post-suffrage feminism was that working class women’s experience 
began to be not only observed and imagined but listened to, 
written down—often by themselves—and published. This was the 
first generation to be fully literate. The feminine demotic 
shaped twentieth-century knowledge and aspiration in concrete 
ways” (274). Moreover, the more contemporary examples of gentle 
but symbolic and important entrances into the culture of a less 
gender-specific cyberspace are rife with examples of the 
everyday feminism and textuality that Woolf found appealing. 
Additionally, Woolf’s piercing yet subtle ways of putting 
forward her ideas were an essential component of who she was. In 




ability to assist women in empowering themselves toward their 
own goals and in search of their own spaces, because, for Woolf, 
the “roles of wives and daughters in history was uppermost in 
her mind” (Lee 631). 
 But, Woolf also recognized the complexities of remaining  
subtle by acknowledging that doing so in some ways equated to 
being silenced, ignored, and considered inconsequential. Woolf 
wrote in her notes that this duality was an “opposition” that 
“would sink deep into her mind” (Lee 324) because, though there 
was “nothing ignoble in being a consumer . . . man wage-earner 
can make his power felt, woman consumer very little power. Wage 
earner’s view predominates” (324). Unfortunately, this is still 
the case in some respects today. But increasingly, research 
shows that although marketing efforts are relatively slow to 
recognize the power of the woman as consumer and breadwinner, 
she is nonetheless growing more and more powerful because of her 
behavior in the world of money, household budgets, and larger 
financial systems, planning, and transactions (Grossbard-
Shechtman 2003). Much of this women-based research is possible 






The Economics of Enough 
 
Present throughout Woolf’s writing is her commentary about 
economic issues, especially with regard to the agency that 
enough money can afford a woman. This concept pervades her 
writing. Many readers of this dissertation are already familiar 
with Woolf’s groundbreaking and pervasive concept of a room of 
one’s own. These words were stated, re-phrased, and re-
emphasized many times in her book, A Room of One’s Own (2005), 
almost as if she knew that the ideal would emerge as an iconic 
phrase and a feminist anthem over time. For example, her 
statement that “it is necessary to have five hundred a year and 
a room with a lock on the door if you are to write fiction or 
poetry” (Woolf 2005 103) illustrates the necessity to writing of 
time, space, and control of one’s environment on a number of 
levels. Her admonition to “earn five hundred a year by your 
wits” (Woolf 2005 65), and “earn money and have a room of your 
own” (Woolf 2005 109) promotes the independence and autonomy of 
mind, spirit, and body that is necessary for a woman to not have 
to rely on men for her basic needs of shelter, food, and 
clothing. Further, these accommodations can afford a woman much 
more than time, space, and financial resources to write. They 




of reality, an invigorating life” (Woolf 2005 109). The concept 
of living in the presence of reality and living an invigorating 
life are important to my arguments about how women in this 
century embrace technologies to their benefit and work with them 
to realize the ideal of presently living an invigorating life in 
their own digitally-influenced realities. 
Some scholars and lay people have tried to monetarily 
equate Woolf’s 500 pounds to a current monetary value. But the 
exact figure is not the point; the essence of her admonition is 
freedom, and freedom, to her, meant space, place, time, and 
provisions. Today, the requirements of a room of one’s own may 
be different, but the essential need for women who would write 
put forth by Woolf remains the same, regardless of class. 
The blogger mom-101 provides an example of how women in 
present-day western culture are using digital technologies to 
assert their right to write in a space and place of their own. 
Although she is in a traditional male-female marriage with two 
young children, she writes about the benefits to her and her 
family of asserting her individuality and her right to write. In 
her post dated June 18, 2010, she writes, 
When I see Sage seated in her little rocking chair, a small 
black board—an IKEA media shelf in another life—on her lap 






I’m on the computer too much. 
 
She can’t get my attention and so she’s emulating me. 
 
She sees me working from home sometimes in our small 
apartment and reads it as “mommy’s not playing with us.” 
Even if Nate is home. Even if their sitter is with them. 
 
So I close my own black laptop and play her game. “What are 




She shouts NO! More than she ever simply says it. You 
know…threes). 
 
“I’m writing a book, mommy.” 
 
“You’re writing a book? What kind of book?” 
 
“A book about me and Thal. And we’re playing and we jump 
and there’s Peter Pan and at the end Bart Sim-Sim comes 
out.” 
 
“That sounds like a great book, Sage!” 
 
“I’m writing a book like you.”  
 
I thought, three year olds pretend to be firefighters and 
tea party hosts and stuffed animal caretakers and fairies 
and princesses and doctors and Woody the cowboy. If she’s 
playing Be a Writer Like Mommy, that’s not such a bad thing 
at all. 
 
And yes I’m writing a book. With Kristin. The book we’ve 
wanted to write for three years, but didn’t know what it 
was, and now we do. Posting here may be lighter for a bit; 
proposal is almost done and is making me more happy than 
happy. 
 





 In this U.S. culture, there is validation for women in 
remaining committed to the work they love as well as the 
families they love. In this case, the young daughter finds her 
mother’s writing admirable even in the presence of the self-
doubt expressed by her mother. Culture changes from generation 
to generation, and perhaps this young girl will grow up without 
the guilt her mother feels for having spent hours writing, 
editing, and contributing money to the household as well as 
ideas to the world.  
Some may claim that the ideal behind a room of one’s own 
and five hundred pounds a year is superficial and unrealistic 
for many women of the world who may not have access to the 
comforts of western culture or the relatively high quality of 
life that a modernized country and culture can provide. But 
Woolf, like I try to do in my work, acknowledges that not all 
women have the same level of resources available to them and 
that it is indeed much more difficult for some women to believe 
that a time might exist when they enjoy their own income and 
their own environment free of external responsibilities, even if 
for short periods of time during their lives. But Woolf insists 
that, although these facts are true, and that “still you may say 
that the mind should rise above such things; and that great 




true that “making a fortune and bearing thirteen children—no 
human being could stand it” (Woolf 2005 22), and that “in the 
first place, to earn money was impossible for [women], and in 
the second . . . the law denied [women] the right to possess 
what money they earned” (Woolf 2005 22). In other words, there 
are always forces that work against the transgressive and 
liberatory work of women on behalf of women, and, even though 
the work may be difficult, slow, and often fruitless, the work 
is essential nonetheless, and the concept of a room of one’s own 
evokes, even if only in the minds of women and not in their 
realities, a sense of accomplishment and a sense of the value 
for having done it for themselves without the rules, 
restrictions, and oppressions of the culture at large, or, as 
Woolf put it, “the claims and tyrannies of their families” 
(Woolf 2005 52). 
 Woolf goes on to observe that “certainly our mothers had 
not provided us with anything comparable to all this—our mothers 
who found it difficult to scrape together thirty thousand 
pounds, our mothers who bore thirteen children”(23). Indeed, it 
would have been difficult for Virginia’s mother to imagine even 
the level of autonomy that Virginia realized by good fortune, or 
luck, in her own life. But women in the 21st century can 




Woolf to their own lives. Many women work and earn their own 
money; many women pursue education and gain independence of 
thought and action; and many women own or have access to 
“rooms,” whether material, digital, or imagined, of their own in 
which to write or pursue whatever independent activities they 
enjoy. Without these trappings that symbolize and actualize 
independence for women, women in contemporary U.S. culture would 
arguably be in comparable conditions to those in which Woolf 
lived. In these ways, Woolf is arguing for the economics of 
enough in that, although there are marked and highly pervasive 
patriarchal systems working against women and the concept of a 
room of one’s own, even in the virtual, real, or mental 
conceptualization of this idea, there is liberation and 
empowerment. 
 Because the notion of a room of one’s own can engender a 
confidence and sense of self-agency for women, I argue that 
women are able to assert claims to their “rooms” in material, 
intellectual, and intangible ways. About the material benefits 
of a woman’s own room, Woolf writes, “what change of temper a 
fixed income will bring about. No force in the world can take 
from me my five hundred pounds. Food, house and clothing are 
mine for ever. Therefore not merely do effort and labour cease, 




cannot hurt me. I need not flatter any man; he has nothing to 
give me”(38). 
 Further, women can, through the concept of the economics of 
enough and a room of one’s own, realize a form of intellectual 
freedom that is not often available to those who may have the 
capacity to produce literature, poetry, fiction, and other 
texts, but who are restricted by poverty. She writes, “the poor 
poet has not in these days, nor has had for two hundred years, a 
dog’s chance . . . That is it. Intellectual freedom depends upon 
material things. Poetry depends upon intellectual freedom. And 
women have always been poor, not for two hundred years merely, 
but from the beginning of time” (Woolf 2005 106). 
 Finally, Woolf advocates for women producing writing 
regardless of the reward or materiality that it might produce. 
Her insistence on this is based on her knowledge that 
independent thought, intangible but undeniable words, when 
written down, live on in perpetuity to influence the future. And 
that, in and of itself, is of great importance to the 
progression of women and the ideals of feminism. In defense of 
this, Woolf states, “if we live another century or so . . . and 
have five hundred a year each of us and rooms of our own; if we 




we think . . . I maintain that [emphasis added] . . . even in 
poverty and obscurity, is worth while” (Woolf 2005 112). 
 In summary, the economics of enough demonstrates how women 
in U.S. culture today are using digital technologies to write 
their own thoughts, to write exactly what they think, even if it 
appears to be only for the sake of having written it and in 
spite of whether it yields material gain or profound levels of 
observation and acknowledgment by wide audiences. And even 
though, for example, some women make money by blogging and 
endorsing products, Woolf might agree that it is the act of 
writing itself that is most liberating. Their words, en masse, 
are the markers of progress, even if some of them cross over the 






CHAPTER 6: THE SCREENING OF EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
The human frame  . . .  
is, heart, body and brain  
all mixed together,  
and not contained  
in separate compartments. 
 
Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (2005) 
 
 
Epistemology as a Feminist Concept 
 
 Epistemology is important to my arguments. Rather than 
simply observing patriarchy at the level of characteristics and 
consequences, like Woolf did so many years ago, I understand 
that changes in social constructs cannot be realized unless the 
underlying cultural thought processes and learned ways of 
knowing the world are examined and processed. In my work, I 
analyze how technologies are being used by women in U.S. culture 
to promote feminist ideals, and I equate that work, and the 
women enacting it, with concepts that Woolf put forward in her 
writing and technological textuality. So far, I have illuminated 
the screens that Woolf used to evaluate and critique how women 
and men understand the world and know what they know. I have 
also discussed the manifestation of those screens through 
similar activities of textual technology in the 21st century. But 




chapter to explain how cognitive theory, feminist theory, and 
theories of texts and technologies work together and can effect 
change in the way knowledge is constructed, perceived, and 
evaluated. While doing so, I also draw on Woolf’s astute 
observations about epistemology to demonstrate the connections I 
make between her work, the theoretical underpinnings, and the 
examples of contemporary TPECs who use digital technologies to 
advance the work and worth of women. 
 Many of Woolf’s ideas about epistemology were ahead of 
their time. Only in very recent decades with the work of such 
scientists as Eleanor Rosch and Antonio Varela, among others, 
have some of the basic ideas that Woolf had about women’s 
understanding of their lives, thought processes, and knowledge 
been validated by more recent theories of subjective and 
situational epistemology such as environmental, economic, 
genetic, and other factors. For example, Woolf stated that “the 
human frame  . . . is, heart, body and brain all mixed together, 
and not contained in separate compartments”(Woolf 2005 18). In 
other words, much like Varela and Rosch observed from the 1970s 
on, the human brain is not a separate and discrete organ that 
functions on its own in isolation from the other systems of the 
internal body but its function is also affected by the 




environments. The synapses that occur because of environmental 
factors and experience influence the nervous and other body 
systems that control human behavior. But more importantly, Woolf 
suspected ahead of her time that these synapses that were 
formerly believed to be fixed and inflexible are actually re-
programmable and remarkably resilient. 
 Woolf also asks probing questions about how we know what we 
know. She states while combing through artifacts at the British 
Museum, “where, I asked myself, picking up a notebook and a 
pencil, is truth” (26)? This is the type of question that I ask 
when I examine the 21st century technologies that are available 
to women and which women use to promote feminist ideals through 
textuality. Where does truth, or Truth (the collective set of 
“knowns”), if you will, reside in the 21st Century? Museums still 
exist, but libraries, for example, as Virginia Woolf knew them, 
large, revered, austere repositories of Truth, no longer exist 
solely in that (quite literally concrete) form. Many people 
nowadays never set foot in a library, even when conducting 
extensive academic research. Libraries have embraced new 
technologies and have evolved into “cybraries” (my term). 
Technology has changed where wisdom and truth reside, it has 




also changed the length, situation, and verifiability of truths 
because of its relatively transitory and fluid nature. 
 The following segment of the Rachel Maddow cable TV show, 
which was featured recently on Jezebel.com, provides a good 
example of how Woolf’s screen of epistemology, or her continuous 
examination of how we know what we know, is being used in 
contemporary digital contexts. The Jezebel.com post is entitled 
“And This is Why it Matters Who Goes on Cable News,” and in this 
segment (see Figure 21-22), Rachel Maddow speaks with Princeton 
professor Melissa Harris Lacewell, who very succinctly and 
intelligently elaborates on the recent trend in women political 
candidates to run on anti-abortion or pro-life platforms. 
Portions of the transcript of this interview include: 
Let’s be completely clear about the facts here. There is no 
place in the world and no time in history where restricting 
women’s reproductive rights makes a people or a nation more 
free or more equal . . . 
 
These extreme positions on abortion are without question a 
war on girls and women . . . 
 
It is incredibly important that we recognize that despite 
the fact that we can be very proud of these women as women 
and as politicians. The question is how do women as 
citizens fare on the other side of them either being 
elected or not elected . . . 
 
It has more to do with our ignorance about our 
understanding about women’s life experience. When you talk 
about the rape and incest clause, I suspect that many 
Americans, maybe even many pro-choice Americans, think that 




unusual occurrence. They suspect that there are maybe a 
dozen or so women for whom that would make a difference in 
any given year . . . 
 
It’s still true that one in four women and girls is likely 
to be sexually assaulted in their lifetimes. The 
possibility of pregnancy is very real;  . . . We’re talking 
about thousands of women and thousands of pregnancies . . .  
 
The point of government isn’t to make life so hard for half 
of our citizens that the only force there to help them is 
God. We as a government and as a people deserve and should 
do better (Jezebel.com). 
 
 





Figure 22: Commentary on Jezebel.com's post "And This is Why It 
Matters Who Goes on Cable News" 
 
 Engaging posts and political commentary such as the type 
that is offered on Jezebel.com offer readers an opportunity to 




Without posts like this, some women may not know the difference 
between pro-choice, pro-life, or anti-abortion platforms. Using 
the screen of feminist epistemology to filter misleading party-
driven ads and confusion-inducing campaign speeches, Jezebel.com 
(and in this case, Rachel Maddow, of course) illuminate what 
otherwise may not be seen and elucidate arguments that may 
otherwise be taken at face value. In other words, media outlets 
such as Jezebel.com help us to understand and question how we 
know what we know. 
 
Defining Epistemology  
 
 In the ways I have introduced above, textual technologies 
that are available to women have increased their ability to 
determine for themselves how they know what they know or even 
how to find out what to know. In many ways, they construct their 
own screens (or frames) of reference via the technologies that 
they use. I think that Woolf would have agreed with me in this 
regard. For example, if technology had not intervened and women 
had not taken it up to use for their own benefit, the situation 
that Woolf describes in A Room of One’s Own (2005) might still 
be women’s circumstance today. She states, “for it needs little 




tried to use her gift for poetry would have been so thwarted and 
hindered by other people, so tortured and pulled asunder by her 
own contrary instincts, that she must have lost her health and 
sanity to a certainty” (Woolf 2005 49). Finally, she also opined 
that, in her time, these new paradigms for understanding the 
construction of knowledge were not possible when she wrote, “but 
these are difficult questions which lie in the twilight of the 
future” (Woolf 2005 76).  
 I insist that including research on the brain and mind is 
critical to my work in feminist texts and technology because 
there are valid, worthy, and revealing studies about cognition 
that disrupt the things that western culture believes about the 
real, the true, and the nature of the world. There is support 
for my thesis within the field of cognitive science, and in 
fact, the very definition of cognitive science that is offered 
by Hubert Dreyfus in his essay “Cognitivism Abandoned,” 
indicates that cognitive science is indeed a multidisciplinary 
field that can and should draw from a multiplicity of resources 
to determine how it is that we know what we know. Dreyfus (1995) 
defined the term cognitive science in a very understandable and 
approachable way, and his definition is the one that I maintain. 
Dreyfus (1995) stated, “Cognitive science is any attempt to 




. it’s just the name for a natural confluence of all the 
disciplines that study the mind-brain: philosophy, linguistics, 
computer science, anthropology, neuroscience, psychology” (72). 
And of course, I believe that Dreyfus (1995) might agree that 
feminist theories and some theories of texts and technologies 
have a place in that definition as well (73). 
 
A Shift From Linear Epistemological Models 
 
In their 1991 book The Embodied Mind, Francisco Varela, 
Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch described their vision of a 
unique but promising entry point for studying cognition. Namely, 
they argued that the mindful meditative qualities of Buddhism 
can successfully marry with some of the precepts of cognitive 
science to produce a more accurate way of studying the brain and 
mind. The word embodied resonated with my reading of the 
feminist theoretical idea that language, ideas, identities, and 
even scientific facts are socially and situationally constructed 
notions perpetuated by a western patriarchal culture in which 
women must negotiate their lives. Donna Haraway, in Simians, 
Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (1991), describes 
situated knowledges as those that “require that the object of 




ground or a resource, never finally as slave to the master that 
closes off the dialectic in his unique agency and authorship of 
‘objective’ knowledge” (198).  
Rosch’s earlier work in categorization and computation 
suggested that the brain’s propensity to categorize ideas, 
objects, and perceptions is based largely on one’s life 
experience and/or shared socialized agreements about the way 
things are. Lakoff (1995) describes Rosch’s early work on 
categorization in an easily understandable way, and he points 
out that even in her earlier work, Rosch began to understand 
that the brain does not work as a simple computational device, 
but relies on its embodied nature to construct the way an 
individual sees the world. Lakoff stated of Rosch’s stance, “the 
psychologically basic categories are in the middle of the 
category hierarchy, that they depend on things like perception 
and motor movement and memory. . . . any objectivist account of 
categorization could not work. . . . Rosch had shown that the 
human body was involved in determining the nature of 
categorization” (Lakoff 119). To paraphrase Lakoff, and to get 
to the basis of Rosch’s point, how humans know the world is not 
the result of objective, removed, scientific facts. In fact, it 
may be that nothing of what we know is disembodied and 




Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s (1991) approach to studying 
cognition was quite reminiscent of feminist standpoint theory, 
and indeed, they wrote about their ideas at nearly exactly the 
same time as Haraway. Haraway wrote Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: 
The Reinvention of Nature in 1991, the same year in which The 
Embodied Mind was first published. Though N. Katherine Hayles 
didn’t write her groundbreaking and highly relevant work How We 
Became Posthuman until 1999, she began writing on the subjects 
of technology, scientific inquiry, and embodiment in her earlier 
work of less acclaim, Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in 
Contemporary Literature and Science, in 1990. In these three 
works, I found the beginnings of the great connections that 
exist among the disciplines, and interestingly, that each area 
of cognitive screening is affected by a variety of technologies. 
 Haraway, Hayles, and others have engaged in discourse with 
cognitive theoretical ideas. In fact, Hayles wrote the book 
review that is quoted on the back cover of The Embodied Mind. 
These well-known theorists, along with Varela, Thompson, and 
Rosch, (1991) as well as many feminist theorists who grapple 
with science--especially the science of technology--have been 





The Feminist Science of Texts and Technology 
 
 Donna Haraway (1991) summed up the essence of feminist 
science when she wrote, “Feminist objectivity is about limited 
location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and 
splitting of subject and object. In this way we might become 
answerable for what we learn how to see” (190). And Haraway 
(1991) further insisted that feminists should “demythologize 
masculinist science” (79); and, she continued by acknowledging 
Hubbard’s claim that feminists should be able to “‘think beyond 
it, [we] must do the necessary work in the field, in the 
laboratories, and in the libraries and come up with ways of 
seeing the facts and of interpreting them’” (qtd. in Haraway 
1991: 79). In the field of cognitive science, Rosch and her 
colleagues began to construct their studies of the brain and 
mind in this feminist way, and they confirmed that formerly 
exclusive science- and technology-related fields can be studied 
and theorized through a situated, embodied feminist 
technological screen. 
 Ulric Neisser (1997), in his essay “The Future of Cognitive 
Science: An Ecological Analysis,” describes Varela, Thompson, 
and Rosch’s (1991) work on embodiment as the beginning of a 




and mind. He states of their work, “many contemporary models of 
information processing are coming to the same conclusion. In a 
trend that seems likely to continue, multiple systems and 
parallel processing have replaced ‘central processing units’ as 
the most popular theoretical architectures in cognitive science” 
(250).  
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s (1991) primary thesis in the 
book is that they use tenets of French philosopher Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s early works such as The Structure of Behavior 
and Phenomenology of Perception to inform their proposal that 
the concept of the body as a physical and an experiential 
structure is not oppositional but relational (xv).  
Additionally, they argue that “science . . . incarnates its 
understanding in technological artifacts . . . thinking/acting 
machines, which have the potential to transform everyday life” 
(xvii). Further, they assert that “the concept of a nonunified 
or decentered . . . cognitive being is the cornerstone of the 
entire Buddhist tradition” (xviii). Throughout the formulation 
of their ideas, they introduce ideas such as the “reflective 
scientist” (3), examine what they mean by “human experience” 
(15), identify the “role of reflection in the analysis of 
experience,” (27), explore the foundations of cognitivism and 




meditative scientific inquiry (85-207), and call for a mindful, 
selfless, more global approach to scientific study of the brain 
and mind (237-245). In my view, the approach that Varela, 
Thompson, and Rosch (1991) take in The Embodied Mind may be a 
bit more spiritual in its emphasis on Buddhism than is feminism 
in general, but because it always-already locates the activities 
of the brain and the mind in situated and embodied 
circumstances, it remains a feminist-scientific approach. 
 
Areas of Conjuncture Among the Disciplines 
 
 Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s The Embodied Mind (1991) 
connects to other cognitive theories as well as theories from 
other disciplines. I researched the connections among embodied 
cognition and other cognitive theories, feminist theory and 
feminist epistemology, memetics, cognitive theories, and 
theories of texts and technology. These theories support an 
integrated and interdisciplinary approach to the study of the 
epistemology that accounts for many of the concerns that critics 
from the above-mentioned fields have addressed with regard to 
traditional, western-formulated constructs that inhibit and 
constrict knowledge acquisition and creation and that deny 




progressive feminist ideas about knowledge, rights, personal 
experience, and the intellectual capabilities of women. Donna 
Haraway described her feminism in her book Simians, Cyborgs, and 
Women: The Reinvention of Nature (1991), when she stated, 
“Feminism loves another science: the sciences and politics of 
interpretation, translation, stuttering, and the partly 
understood. Feminism is about the sciences of the multiple 
subject with (at least) double vision. Feminism is about a 
critical vision consequent upon a critical positioning in 
inhomogenous gendered social space” (195). By approaching the 
study of the human brain in this multi-faceted way, feminist-
technology theorists can embody the breakthroughs they want to 
realize with regard to societal attitudes about women and their 
identities, politics, and textuality. 
In just one example of the variety of connections with 
other cognitive theories, V.S. Ramachandran developed a 
mechanism for treating phantom limb syndrome in patients who had 
suffered arm and hand amputations. With his invention of the 
mirror box, Ramachandran (1998) broke new ground in 
demonstrating the brain’s uncanny ability to re-map itself and 
allow amputees, and later, stroke victims, to begin addressing 






Figure 23: Visual representation of the mirror box (2010) 
 
This is just one of the most famous ways in which 
Ramachandran revolutionized the way scientists think about the 
brain, vision, and the possibilities offered by conceptualizing 
the brain as an embodied organ. Charles Wolfe (2005) agrees that 
Ramachandran’s (1998) tenets are key to working through the 
complexities inherent in conceptualizing the embodied mind. He 
states, “Consider for instance the fact of volitional control of 
a phantom limb, as described in Ramachandran’s (1998) famous 




reality box’) and its implications for an integrated vision of 
the body, mind, and brain” (2). In other words, since 
Ramachandran’s approaches are noted and lauded for their simple 
processes that yield profound insights, his embracing of the 
idea of an integrated mind-body is quite important for advancing 
this theory.  
In Wolfe’s own work, he has moved forward the concept of 
the social brain, which links the body, the brain, and the 
world. In this construct, Wolfe argues, the social brain “must 
also be an embedded vision of the brain, not just in the body 
but in the network of symbolic relations. One can describe this 
as the 'social brain', and emphasize the coeval, co-originary 
relation between organ and prosthesis, so that the difference 
between an original substrate and an artifact disappears or 
becomes purely instrumental” (Wolfe 2005). My interpretation of 
Wolfe’s statement concludes that his social brain corresponds 
with Ramachandran’s (1998) mirror box in that the brain allows 
itself to re-learn its embodiment within a new or different 
material, corporeal reality such as an arm prosthesis or a 
paralyzed hand. Because researchers like Ramachandran have 
shown, and theorists such as Wolfe have demonstrated, that the 
brain is able to recreate a new sense of embodiment and overcome 




emotional circumstances, they have opened new doors in the world 
of science that may allow for even greater reimaginings in 
related fields such as sociology, psychology, technology, 
writing, and more, and those new imaginings could connect these 
fields with science to come close to the more egalitarian cyborg 
future that Donna Haraway and other feminists envision or the 
man-womanly, woman-manly identity that Woolf idealized. In other 
words, if the brain itself can adapt and thrive, certainly the 
social contracts and constructs of men and women also can 
change.  
 N. Katherine Hayles (2002) questions how the embodied mind 
approach may impact the way we continue to study human 
relationships in the future when she states, “Consider first the 
force of habits that shape embodied responses—especially 
proprioception, the internal sense that gives us the feeling 
that we occupy our bodies rather than merely possess them” 
(299). Hayles (2002) further elaborates on this concept by 
referring to philosopher Clark’s (1997) assertion that 
“cognition should not be seen as taking place in the brain 
alone” (302) and that “the distinctive characteristic of humans 
has always been to enroll objects into their cognitive systems, 
creating a distributed functionality [Clark] calls extended 




extended mind is not a new concept. Even David Hume recognized 
that embodiment had something to do with perception and knowing. 
Neisser, in his 1997 essay “The Future of Cognitive Science: An 
Ecological Analysis,” cites Hume’s early suspicions about the 
concept of the human self when he states that Hume intimately 
studied his own concept of self and determined that in no way 
could he perceive of his self without simultaneously perceiving 
some other perception along with it. In other words, when Hume 
thought of self, the thought always was accompanied by some 
sense of light or darkness, love or hatred, pain or pleasure, 
and those associated thoughts indicated some of the first 
recorded revelations that perceptions, especially perceptions of 
the brain, mind, and self, are embodied (250). 
But Hayles (2002) took the notion of embodiment even 
further when she stated, “the joining of technology with biology 
has created a ‘cognitive machinery’ that is ‘now intrinsically 
geared to transformation, technology-based expansions and a 
snowballing and self-perpetuating process of computational and 
representational growth’” (302). In the final chapter, I 
explicitly bring together Woolf’s ideas about writing, 
creativity, and space/place with feminist theories and theories 




with regard to the 21st century technologized mind/body that I 
have described above.  
In the following section, I demonstrate how the examples I 
have shown above can be combined with feminist epistemology and 
feminist theory to renew the necessary examination of western 
culture, politics, and the situation of women and what those 
renewals mean for a technology-saturated future in which more 
and more demands are placed on women to be all-accessible, all-
plugged-in, and all-able, all the time. Further, I suggest how 
Woolf’s ideals of autonomy and isolation relate to these 
expanded ideas about epistemology and women’s participation in 
creative acts. Moreover, I draw conclusions about women’s 
creativity using technology that support my claim that many of 
these technological forms of writing are demonstrations of 
creative feminist textuality. 
 
Feminist Theory and Epistemology 
 
 So, if the brain can re-map, re-learn, and re-interpret its 
embodied self as I have so far defended, I argue that humans can 
also re-map, re-learn, and re-interpret their social contracts 
and socialized institutions of power and privilege, which are 




have been shown scientifically to be intimately interdependent, 
a feminist epistemology that values context and situation, that 
posits facts as social constructions, and that favors the 
particular over the universal, when it is paired with the 
concept of the embodied mind, has the potential to be adopted by 
western culture in general and enacted in technological 
environments that can empower women. I say this because the 
realm of science has typically been associated with maleness and 
authority, and the body has remained in the realm of femaleness, 
as Pressley (2008) describes when she states, “dualistic 
thinking has led to the association of maleness with reason, 
mind, objectivity, and universals while femaleness is associated 
with emotion, body, subjectivity, and particulars” (5), a 
cultural condition that Woolf wrote about often in derogatory 
terms.  Similarly, Haraway asserted in Simians, Cyborgs, and 
Women: The Reinvention of Nature (1991) that, “An epistemology 
that justifies not taking a stand on the nature of things is of 
little use to women trying to build a shared politics. But 
feminists also know that the power of naming a thing is the 
power of objectifying, of totalizing” (79). So, since the (male) 
realm of science, as demonstrated in the examples above from 
Ramachandran, Wolfe, Hume, and others, knowingly or not, 




claims that the (male) mind and (female) body are codependent, 
inseparable entities, it remains possible that socially 
constructed, faulty patriarchal practices relating to authority, 
power, and privilege can be re-negotiated and re-learned, and 
more inclusive ones can be re-institutionalized, as Woolf may 
have fantasized and as I have described using technology-based 
examples. 
Moreover, feminist epistemology can be paired with feminist 
theories such as standpoint theory, which analyzes the systems 
that validate oppressive systems; de-dichotomizes binarial 
notions such as reason/emotion, mind/body, universal/particular, 
good/bad, woman/man, and others; and investigates the 
relationships between knowers and known objects, to expand 
western culture’s acceptance of values, aesthetics, and ways of 
knowing that are currently marginalized, denied, or ignored. 
Pressley (2008) may agree with this assertion, because she 
further states, “Feminism has also interplayed with . . . social 
investigations of knowledge. . . . Feminist epistemologists do 
not suggest that empirical evidence is wrong, but rather that it 
is necessary to understand that most beliefs are as much a 
result of their social context as they are factually true. . . 
These philosophers are often working on undertakings that are 




type of science that Woolf envisioned as a vindicator of the 
many intuitional things she knew about the intellectual 
capabilities of women that were not allowed voice during her own 
time. In a similar way, Lorraine Code (1994) writes about her 
term, epistemic responsibility, which refers to cognitive agency 
and choice, as being 
framed within a construction of intellectual virtue—
epistemic character—that owes a debt to virtue ethics. 
It is premised on the assumption that the items that a 
person knows quite unequivocally, as she knows that a 
cup is on the table, comprise a small part of her—or 
anyone’s—knowledge. The persistent exemplary status of 
such items in foundational and coherentist theories of 
knowledge obscures the extent to which there are 
genuine choices about how to know the world and its 
inhabitants, choices that become apparent only in more 
complex epistemic circumstances—for example, in 
knowing other cultures, negotiating an environmental 
policy, assessing the significance of certain actions 
and policies, or predicting the implications of tests 
and experiments. Such circumstances and others like 
them, occasion questions about epistemic 
responsibility. In so doing they broaden the scope of 
epistemology to include considerations of credibility 
and trust, of epistemic obligations and the legitimate 
scope of enquiry. These issues, in turn, make 
knowledge production more a communal than an 
individual endeavor (2).  
In my own words, there is now a new direction for the old 
feminist adage that ‘the personal is political;’ my new but 












So far I have established connections between the 
scientific embodied mind and the political embodied mind, and I 
have implied that inherent in these terms is the notion that 
they are relational concepts that result from continual changes 
and shifts in the ways that brains and bodies interact with and 
co-create the world in which they exist. Now I transition into 
the concept that I refer to as the politically embodied cyborg 
that holds promise and possibilities for a more inclusive, 
tolerant, and less socially restricting future by introducing 
the concept of memetics.  
Dougherty (2001) describes memetics as a concept that 
assumes that “belief is more manipulable and controllable than 
the inadequately scientific social scientists of both the past 
and the present had ever imagined” (87). Dougherty (2001) 
reinscribes Dawkins’ work on memes that equates them to 
sociological DNA, when he states, “These fast-evolving new 
genes, or memes, include cultural products such as religious 
beliefs, political convictions, pop culture fads, or virtually 
anything else that can get passed on by imitation. These things 
too are living replicators, since, as Dawkins concurs with N.K. 




(88). And Dougherty (2001) also recalls Susan Blackmore’s 
description of memetics as “a new way of looking at the self” 
(94) that she labels a selfplex for which “our brains provide 
the ideal machinery” and “our society provides the selective 
environment” (qtd. in Dougherty: 94) for it to construct and 
thrive.  
In these ways, I formulate my synthesis of mind, body, and 
technology. For example, DNA has often been referred to as 
genetic code, and code is a term intimately associated with 
computer technology, so it could be said that DNA is a bodily 
manifestation of a type of encoded, technological system. 
Dougherty (2001) carries this idea further when he states that 
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) offer “a helpful comparison 
between computationalism and connectionism,” where “symbolic 
regularities emerge from parallel distributed processes” (qtd. 
in Dougherty: 88). In other words, the mind is not just a 
computer, it is a much more sophisticated thinking, feeling, 
adapting, re-mapping, environmentally-responsive machine that 
requires definite material conditions for survival. 
Additionally, Dougherty (2001) believes that “this computer 
model possesses a simple elegance. And Dougherty agrees with 
J.M. Balkin’s proposition that “we can [thus] compare certain 




the software that is installed on a computer and that allows a 
computer to process information” (90). Further, this cultural 
software enjoys “scientific credibility” (90) because culture 
allows certain beliefs to perpetuate and it disallows others 
their voice. And Dougherty offered that Balkin’s cultural 
software “answers the question of how traditions, beliefs, 
desires, practices, and basic cultural ‘know-how’ spread through 
society. For culture, think software installed on a computer; 
for the human bearers of culture, think the computer hardware 
that processes the software data” (qtd. in Dougherty: 90).  
Through this technological screen, those of us who live in 
western culture can more fully comprehend the importance and 
significance of studying the brain, mind, and body through the 
mind-body as software-hardware analogy. Likewise, Hayles (2002), 
in an elaboration of her mind-body theory, similarly stated that 
“the human who inhabits the information-rich environments of 
contemporary technological societies knows that the dynamic and 
fluctuating boundaries of her embodied cognitions develop in 
relation to other cognizing agents embedded throughout the 
environment, among which the most powerful are intelligent 
machines” (303). And Haraway (1991) also offered ideas about the 
influence of technologies on the way knowledge about the world 




and ironies at the heart of all knowledge production; we are not 
in charge of the world. We just live here and try to strike up 
non-innocent conversations by means of our prosthetic devices, 
including our visualization technologies” (199). 
Through the series of conjunctures I have described above, 
I developed my theory of the TPEC, the post-postmodern human 
cultural machine that is able to stratify itself among the 
formerly restrictive boundaries of cognitive science, 
psychology, sociology, feminism, and technology to help western 
culture move in new directions that acknowledge situatedness, 
particularity, and more inclusive ranges of culturally accepted 
values and ways of acquiring knowledge and knowing the world, 
and participating in it. The idea of the politically embodied 
cyborg is not the stuff of science fiction and fantasy, but it 
is indeed the emerging reality of people (at least people in 
U.S. culture). I maintain that this is especially true for women 
in the western culture.  
In this analysis by Hayles (2002), she draws on Roland 
Barthes’ meditation on Albert Einstein and states, “Barthes 
related the duality of physical brain and prodigious mind to a 
split between Einstein the researcher and Einstein the knower of 
the world’s innermost secrets. Rooted in the physical brain, 




of insight, at least in the popular imagination. This 
oscillation between ordinary physical reality and occult power 
translates . . . into a desire to use advanced technology to 
reveal the constructedness of our everyday world” (310). Hayles 
(2002) illustrates in a very powerful way that the embodied mind 
approach to studying the brain, ways of knowing, and the 
perpetuation of cultural values and norms can yield 
extraordinary new insights into the ways humans shape and are 
shaped by their internal, external, and digital worlds. And for 
me, when the embodied mindset combines with feminism, texts and 
technology, and thereby, politics, the opportunities for women’s 
participation, empowerment, and respect, as well as more 
inclusive worldviews expand exponentially. It is this 






CHAPTER 7: THE FUTURE OF THE TPEC 
 
A book is not made of sentences  
laid end to end,  
but of sentences built . . .  
into arcades and domes 
 





The four major screens through which Virginia Woolf 
examined her life and the lives of women, sex, sexuality, and 
gender; aesthetics; misogyny and the economics of enough; and 
epistemology are the filters through which she critiqued her 
culture and the status of women within it during the time that 
she lived (1882-1941). I think that it is evident from the 
textual technological examples that I have provided that the 
screens Woolf employed are still relevant today, especially for 
women, and they are useful tools for exploring women’s creative 
work in digital environments.  
In the 21st Century U.S., women are engaged in every aspect 
of society, including those areas that maintain labels such as 
non-traditional, progressive, and feminist, as well as the more 
traditional, home-based roles (“housewives” being one, whose 




of a variety of cultural influences, not the least of which is 
the “Housewives Of” series on the Bravo cable TV channel). In 
the decades since Woolf’s time, women have emerged through the 
aftermath of several wars, sexual revolutions, the “me” decade 
of the 80s, the return to “balance” in the 90’s, and the current 
new millennial era, which is unfolding as I write, as TPECs who 
are still struggling for equality but also are well-equipped to 
fully participate in the shaping of the digital future. These 
Woolfian screens resonate with current cultural topics that can 
be used in technological environments such as Web sites like 
Jezebel.com, Grupo Factor X, and Current.com, Facebook accounts 
such as Minal Hajratwala and Feminism is Important to the 21st 
Century, and blogs such as Mom-101, all of which garner 
attention from the media, academicians, and the general public, 
have something to say about how women live, work, play, and 
struggle in the world, and assist TPECs in recognizing each 
other and supporting like-minded contributions.  
 When examining contemporary culture by screening through 
the ways that men and women perceive their sexuality and gender 
roles, certain trends quickly surface that continue to resonate 
in the digital culture of the U.S. today. The fluid identities 
that our culture includes, such as gender-bending avatars in 




and chat rooms, and even anonymous cyber-sexual experiences 
resonate with Woolf’s fascination with “alternative membership” 
(Lee 638). These concerns appear at the forefront of Woolf’s A 
Room of One’s Own (2005), and they bear the weight of careful 
examination of progressive theories of epistemology and 
scientific study. In fact, Lee (1998) describes the powerful A 
Room of One’s Own (2005) as “bids for freedom” (520). She also 
states that A Room of One’s Own (2005) has a “utopian ending” 
and sets women “free from histories of repressions and 
limitations” (520). I have shown how 21st Century TPECs are 
proving Woolf right through their progressive work in digital 
environments.  
 Had she lived in the 21st Century, Woolf might have found 
another outlet for her own progressive thoughts, words, and 
actions in some of the digital venues that are available today. 
In doing so, she too might have felt freed “through the idea of 
a woman’s writing, from the pressures of the family, the doom of 
fate, the prison of madness” (Lee 521). For example, Lee (1998) 
states in her biography of Woolf that,  
In her twenties Virginia Stephen was sexually confused and 
uncertain . . . there was no acceptable outlet for her 
erotic feelings about women—as there were accredited ways 
of behaving for the Apostolic Cambridge homosexuals, or for 
randy bohemian artists . . . with their wives and 
mistresses. Except as a joke, she did not define herself as 




not a concept for her, or a group for her to join, or a 
political identity. Instead, she was poised between 
incompatible identities and roles (241).  
 
Further, through her writing, especially through A Room of One’s 
Own (2005), Woolf found ways to express her ideas about and 
struggles with identity. Lee (1998) wrote that Woolf had “her 
own great variety of selves” (522), and additionally, “She knew 
that she had different ways of presenting her own identity” 
(522). 
It is clear that Woolf embodied the TPEC’s fluid identity. 
Unfortunately for Woolf, there were few if any outlets in which 
she could express her multiple selves, and this void, in part, 
might have contributed to her well-known lack of self-worth, 
depression, and anxiety. Had Woolf access to communities of 
like-minded individuals that included women, stabilizing 
psychotropic medications (a complicated suggestion which, with 
regard to women’s use of them in current times, could fill many 
another entire dissertation and then some), some progress 
towards equality for women, and other advancements, she might 
have found a validity in her ideas and ideals that may have 
helped her through some of her mental crises.  
It is no secret that Virginia Woolf committed suicide, and 
I don’t want to finish this dissertation, which contains so much 




without in some way confronting this difficult subject. Though I 
am not a psychologist, I can’t help but wonder whether her bouts 
with self-loathing may have been soothed in some way by 
connecting with like-minded individuals who may have “liked” her 
Facebook update or provided an affirming comment on her blog 
post? Could her emerging feminist identity have been validated 
by understanding that many people grapple with similar 
psychological issues and that in some ways these can be mediated 
by participation in textual technologies? How would currently-
available psychotropic medications for bipolar disorder have 
affected Woolf’s writing, convictions, and persistence of 
thought? These questions really can’t be answered, but I 
understand that they exist and add a troubling dimension to the 
arguments that I make. But Woolf was not unaware of her mental 
condition. In fact, she was keenly aware of her idiosyncracies, 
mental frailties, and inconsistent health. In reading Lee’s 
biography, it became clear to me that Woolf’s health problems 
actually made her convictions stronger, intensified her desire 
for expression, and increased her ability to take risks. 
Woolf also struggled with some of the issues that concern 
cultural critics, theorists, and commentators today about the 
Internet, especially the notion that anyone can be anything in 




commented on the unease caused by the shifting, in some ways 
fabricated, identities that she recognized in herself when she 
stated that “Lying had always seemed to her a dull form of 
conversation; but after all, lie one must” (qtd. in Lee: 517). 
In other words, in order for women to make progress, they 
sometimes have to devise ways of working within their 
patriarchal culture to subvert it. The notion of working from 
within patriarchal culture to subvert its oppression of women is 
the basis of many feminist arguments and theories. That 
cyberspace becomes a field of exploration for this conversation 
is not surprising because in many ways, the online world is a 
frontier that has yet to be settled. Opportunities for women 
abound, and perhaps the TPEC will enable such a fluid perception 
of truth that “lying,” under its current derogatory definition, 
will no longer exist. 
Woolf often wrote about the therapeutic value of reading 
and writing, but those pursuits also troubled her because she 
found the content of almost all literature, histories, political 
documents, and biographies lacking of input by women and respect 
for women. And although she struggled with the meaning of the 
term feminism, I believe she would have agreed that feminism is 
central to women’s progress in writing, to their ability to use 




perpetuating a TPEC future that values women’s contributions, 
ideas, and intelligence. 
Woolf clearly envisioned a TPEC future for politically 
engaged feminist textual technological activist women writers 
when she wrote, “these are difficult questions which lie in the  
twilight of the future” (76). The TPEC in the 21st Century 
combines Woolf’s politically embodied writer with Haraway’s 
cyborg and the capabilities of women who use Internet 
technologies. The TPEC honors Woolf’s (2005) assertion that “a 
book is not made of sentences laid end to end, but of sentences 
built, if an image helps, into arcades and domes” (76), and I 
show how her work may have influenced the creative 
postmodernized writing of the women who run Web sites, update 
Facebook accounts, and blog.  
 I have researched and analyzed the variety of technology-
enhanced methods TPECs use to engender writing, assert their 
identities, bring their thoughts to light, and make their 
positions known. In the end, TPEC writing is “adapted to the 
body”(Woolf 2005 77), tampers “with the expected sequence” 
(Woolf 2005 80), and “catch[es] those unrecorded gestures, those 
unsaid or half-said words, moths on the ceiling, when women are 
alone, unlit by the capricious and coloured light of the other 




oppression on the body—giving it its form, its gestures, its 
movement, its motricity, and even its muscles” (Wittig 1992). 
The TPEC writes “unconsciously, merely giving things their 
natural order, as a woman would, if she wrote like a woman . . . 
who has forgotten that she is a woman, so that her pages [are] 
full of that curious sexual quality which comes only when sex is 
unconscious of itself” (Woolf 2005 90-91). And finally, The TPEC 
writes “what [it wishes] to write, that is all that matters; and 
whether it matters for ages or only for hours, nobody can say” 
(Woolf 2005 105). Would that we as scholars and/or our students 
manifest any of these qualities in our writing, universities and 
U.S. culture in general would become richer, more diverse, and 
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